arguments for the existence of God

I Don’t Care – Part 6

Aquinas is often thought of as a rigourously logical and systematic thinker.  This is only half-true.  There is a good deal of vaguness, ambiguity, and illogical thinking in his book Summa Theologica, as far as I can see. Here is a cautionary note from a philosopher who is an expert on Aquinas: From the concept of I Don’t Care – Part 6

I Don’t Care – Part 5

The famous Five Ways passage by Aquinas in Summa Theologica does not contain five arguments for the existence of God. Rather, it contains ZERO arguments for the existence of God.  There is actually only one argument for the existence of God in the Summa Theologica, and the reasoning in the Five Ways passage only represents a I Don’t Care – Part 5

I Don’t Care – Part 3

According to the Christian philosopher Peter Kreeft, and many others, Aquinas gives five different arguments for the existence of God.  In the Handbook of Christian Apologetics (IVP, 1994; hereafter: HCA) by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, there is a chapter that lays out twenty different arguments for the existence of God, and the first five arguments I Don’t Care – Part 3

I Don’t Care – Part 2

OK. Maybe I care just a little bit. I summarized my complaint against Aquinas’ Five Ways this way (in response to a comment from Jeff Lowder): I’m just pointing out that (a) NONE of the Five Ways is an argument for the existence of God as it stands (in the section called “Whether God Exists?”), I Don’t Care – Part 2

Why I am Not Concerned about Christian Theist Philosophers of Religion

One reason I am not concerned about the prevalence of Christian theists in the field of philosophy of religion is that they do a nice job of arguing against each other. William Lane Craig’s favorite argument for the existence of God is the Kalam cosmological argument. I’m happy that there are some atheist philosophers who Why I am Not Concerned about Christian Theist Philosophers of Religion

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 11

If I understand William Craig’s third objection to AMR, then he is basically offering an inductive  teleological argument for the existence of God (similar to how Richard Swinburne argues for God)  based on the assumption that there are objective moral values plus the claim that humans and the circumstances in which humans find themselves are Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 11