theistic metaethics

The Argument from First-Order Ethical Beliefs for Moral Realism

Definitions first-level moral belief: a belief that something is good or evil or that something is of equal or greater value than something else second-level moral belief: a belief about some or all first-level moral beliefs The Argument  As far as I can tell, the argument from ordinary language originated with John Post, but has The Argument from First-Order Ethical Beliefs for Moral Realism

Semantic vs. Ontological Ethical Naturalism vs. Divine Command Theory

Jonathan Berg, in his essay “How could ethics depend on religion?”, notes there are various versions of the ‘Divine Command Theory’ of ethics.  In its strongest form, the Divine Command Theory (DCT) is a theory about the very meaning of words, what Jonathan Harrison has called a linguistic theory.  After describing various problems with the Semantic vs. Ontological Ethical Naturalism vs. Divine Command Theory

Arguing from Moral Ontology to Theism by Eliminating Nontheistic Alternatives

1. Defintions Moral ontology is the branch of meta-ethics concerned with the ontology or metaphysics of moral facts and properties.  Within the field of moral ontology, it is a commonplace that the nature of moral facts and properties fall into one of three categories: natural, nonnatural, or supernatural.  Natural facts and properties are those facts Arguing from Moral Ontology to Theism by Eliminating Nontheistic Alternatives

J.P. Moreland’s 1993 Moral Argument for Theism

J.P. Moreland argues that traditional theism is the best explanation for the truth of ethical nonnaturalism in the broad sense, a correspondence theory of moral truth, and the falsity of ethical egoism.[1] Definitionsnon-natural property: an attribute that is not a scientific, physical characteristic of physics or chemistry (e.g., being a C fiber, having negative charge, J.P. Moreland’s 1993 Moral Argument for Theism

Wes Morriston’s The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command metaethics

The fact that many people do not believe that there is a God creates an obvious problem for divine command metaethics. They have moral obligations, and are often enough aware of having them. Yet it is not easy to think of such persons as “hearing” divine commands. This makes it hard to see how a Wes Morriston’s The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command metaethics

Theism, Atheism, and Metaethics

In response to my comments on “Atheist Ethicist: Theism, Atheism, and Blame,” Keith Parsons rightfully pointed out an error and an inconsistency in my comments where I had denied that theism has metaethical implications. As is often (if not always) the case in philosophy, a lot of this depends on terminology. And although I responded Theism, Atheism, and Metaethics

Theological Noncognitivism on Youtube

I am not a noncognitivist, but philosopher Ted Drange says that this video is the best one on YouTube about noncognitivism. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5wV_REEdvx Your name Your email Subject Your message (optional)