theism

Problems With TASO: Part 1

INTRO TO TASO For several years, I have been working on an article about Richard Swinburne’s case for God. I’m currently revising the section of that article dealing with the third argument in Swinburne’s case: TASO (the Teleological Argument from Spatial Order). In working on that section of the article, I noticed that my favorite Problems With TASO: Part 1

Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 11: Evaluation of Argument #1

THE CONTEXT Peter Kreeft and his co-author Ronald Tacelli open their Handbook of Christian Apologetics  (hereafter: HCA) with these words about their “reasons for writing this book”: Kreeft and Tacelli believe that heaven and hell are in the balance for every human being, when it comes to acceptance or rejection of “the Christian faith”.  So, it Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 11: Evaluation of Argument #1

Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 9: The Argument from Change

MY EVALUATION OF THE SECOND HALF OF KREEFT’S CASE In Part 1 and Part 2 I argued that eight out of ten (80%) of the last ten arguments in Peter Kreeft’s collection of twenty arguments (from Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Chapter 3; hereafter: HCA) are AWFUL arguments that are not worthy of serious consideration, that we should thus toss them aside, and ignore Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 9: The Argument from Change

Feser’s Case for God – Part 8: Actualization of a Potential

FESER’S ANALYSIS OF CHANGE A key idea in Chunk #1 of Feser’s Aristotelian argument is his analysis or understanding of change: A. The occurrence of any change C presupposes the actualization of a potential of some thing or substance S which changes. There are three phrases that constitute the key components of Feser’s analysis of change: the actualization of… …a Feser’s Case for God – Part 8: Actualization of a Potential

2017 in the Rearview Mirror

I had hoped to answer the question “Does God exist?” in 2017, at least to my own satisfaction.  No such luck.  That was a bit too aggressive of a goal.   However, I did make some good progress.  I learned that Norman Geisler’s case for God (in When Skeptics Ask) is a steaming pile of dog 2017 in the Rearview Mirror

Feser’s Case for God – Part 7: Feser’s Concept of Change

FOCUS ON CHUNK #1 We are examining the first few premises of Edward Feser’s lengthy (i.e. containing fifty statements) Aristotelian argument for the existence of God, in Chapter 1 of Five Proofs of the Existence of God (hereafter: FPEG).  What I call Chunk #1 of this argument consists of the following premises and inferences: (FPEG, Location 477-493, p.35-36) Let’s Feser’s Case for God – Part 7: Feser’s Concept of Change

Feser’s Case for God – Part 5: Potential Attributes vs. Contingent Attributes

POTENTIAL ATTRIBUTES VS. CONTINGENT ATTRIBUTES I think (i.e. strongly suspect) it is important to understand the relationship between Edward Feser’s concept of the potential attributes of X and logical possibility.  Feser does not provide clarification on this point, at least not in Chapter 1 of his book Five Proofs of the Existence of God (hereafter: Feser’s Case for God – Part 5: Potential Attributes vs. Contingent Attributes