arguments for theism

Swinburne’s Case for God – Part 4

Does the utterance of the words ‘God exists’ amount to a meaningful utterance? Does this utterance express a statement?  Two considerations support the claim that this is a meaningful utterance:1. ‘God exists’ is a grammatical sentence.2. The word ‘exists’ has an established meaning. The main question to consider is whether the word ‘God’ has a Swinburne’s Case for God – Part 4

Swinburne’s Case for God – Part 2

The purpose of the first of five phases of Swinburne’s case for God is to show that the statement ‘God exists’ makes a coherent factual (logically contingent) statement.  He thinks he has accomplished this in his book The Coherence of Theism (revised edition, hereafter: COT) for a somewhat pared-down concept of God, that he calls a ‘contingent Swinburne’s Case for God – Part 2

The Implausibility of Appealing to the Many-Worlds Hypothesis to Defeat the Fine-Tuning Argument

I know what I am about to write will be controversial among atheists–one of them may (?) be a certain professional physicist who writes regularly for The Secular Outpost–but I have never agreed with the idea of appealing to the hypothesis of multiple universes (“multiverse”) as an objection to the fine-tuning argument for God’s existence. The Implausibility of Appealing to the Many-Worlds Hypothesis to Defeat the Fine-Tuning Argument

Fine-Tuning Argument: Having and Eating the Cake

Richard Swinburne adopted the Fine Tuning Argument as the heart of his ‘Teleological Argument from Spatial Order’ (The Existence of God, 2nd ed., p.167-190). The key premise of this argument mentions tuning: “…the universe…[is] tuned–that is, such as to allow and indeed make significantly probable the existence of human bodies.” (EOG, p.188)Here is another statement Fine-Tuning Argument: Having and Eating the Cake