arguments for theism

How the Distinction between Deductive vs. Inductive Arguments Can Mask Uncertainty

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Everyone who has taken a philosophy 101 class has learned the distinction between deductive and inductive arguments. It goes like this. Only deductive arguments may be valid; an argument is valid if and only if the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its premises. Otherwise, the argument is invalid. If an argument is … How the Distinction between Deductive vs. Inductive Arguments Can Mask Uncertainty

Jeff Lowder Speaking in London

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I will be speaking to the Central London Humanist Group. Here are the details: Topic: Evidence about God: What Apologists Don’t Want You to Know When: Thursday, 28 March at 7pm Where: Conway Hall in central London LINK

Swinburne’s modal argument for the existence of the soul

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By Agnieszka Rostalska and Rafal Urbaniak Abstract & Introduction: Richard Swinburne (Swinburne and Shoemaker 1984; Swinburne 1986) argues that human beings currently alive have non–bodily immaterial parts called souls. In his main argument in support of this conclusion (modal argument),roughly speaking, from the assumption that it is logically possible that a human being survives the … Swinburne’s modal argument for the existence of the soul

Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism refuted

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Humanism for Children: A Reply to William Lane Craig

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William Lane Craig is right. There has been “a resurgence of interest in arguments for God’s existence.”  So-called “new atheists” aside, what he fails to mention is that there has also been a resurgence of interest in arguments against God’s existence by philosophers like J.L. Schellenberg, Quentin Smith, Paul Draper, Stephen Maitzen, Michael Martin, and … Humanism for Children: A Reply to William Lane Craig

An Explanatory Argument from Moral Ontology against Metaphysical Naturalism (v2.0)

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(The following is a revised version of my “Arguing from Moral Ontology by Eliminating Nontheistic Alternatives.”)1. Definitions Moral ontology is the branch of meta-ethics concerned with the ontology or metaphysics of moral facts and properties.  Within the field of moral ontology, it is a commonplace that the nature of moral facts and properties fall into one … An Explanatory Argument from Moral Ontology against Metaphysical Naturalism (v2.0)

William Davis’s Argument from Objective, Nonutilitarian Value to Theism

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Here is an excerpt from Davis’s chapter in Reason for the Hope Within. While many human activities are pursued because of their usefulness (utility), and some are valuable only in the eyes of a few people (nonobjective), there are kinds of human activity which possess objective, nonutilitarian value.  Two obvious examples of this are self-sacrificial … William Davis’s Argument from Objective, Nonutilitarian Value to Theism

The Evidential Argument from Moral Agency (AMA) Revisited

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I want to revisit Paul Draper’s very interesting argument from moral agency against metaphysical naturalism.[1] Informal Statement of the Argument We know that moral agents exist. If we ignore for a moment the evidence for moral agents–i.e., independent of the evidence for moral agents–we have much more reason on theism than on naturalism to expect … The Evidential Argument from Moral Agency (AMA) Revisited