Richard Swinburne’s newest book: Mind, Brain, and Free Will
This book will be published May 15, 2013. Here is the book’s description on Amazon: Mind, Brain, and Free Will presents a powerful new case for substance dualism (the idea that humans consist of two parts–body and soul) and for libertarian free will (that humans have some freedom to choose between alternatives, independently of the … Richard Swinburne’s newest book: Mind, Brain, and Free Will
Is It a Crock to Use Bayes’ Theorem to Measure Evidence about God? Part 2
I want to continue where I left off in part 1 of my response to Metacrock on the use of Bayes’ Theorem (BT) to measure evidence about God. Here is Metacrock: Bayes’ theorem was introduced first as an argument against Hume’s argument on miracles, that is to say, a proof of the probability of miracles. … Is It a Crock to Use Bayes’ Theorem to Measure Evidence about God? Part 2
Is It a Crock to Use Bayes’ Theorem to Measure Evidence about God? Part 1
Over at the Christian Cadre, “Metacrock” has written a post entitled, “Bayes Theorum [sic] and Probability of God: No Dice!” Metacrock makes a number of points regarding the use of Bayes’ Theorem (BT) with evidence about God’s existence. I want to comment on many of those points. It is understandable that naturalistic thinkers are uneasy … Is It a Crock to Use Bayes’ Theorem to Measure Evidence about God? Part 1
Craig’s Argument from Intentionality
Here is my summary of Craig’s “argument from intentionality” in his recent debate with Alex Rosenberg. 5. God is the best explanation for the intentional states of consciousness in the world. Philosophers are puzzled by states of intentionality, the state of being about something or being of something. It signifies the object-directendess of our thoughts, … Craig’s Argument from Intentionality
Mark Douglas Seward: Fine-tuning as Evidence for a Multiverse: Why White is Wrong
Abstract Roger White (God and design, Routledge, London, 2003) claims that while the fine-tuning of our universe, α , may count as evidence for a designer, it cannot count as evidence for a multiverse. First, I will argue that his considerations are only correct, if at all, for a limited set of multiverses that have … Mark Douglas Seward: Fine-tuning as Evidence for a Multiverse: Why White is Wrong
Robert Oerter’s Fine-Tuning Argument for Naturalism
Robert Oerter has written an interesting post on his blog outlining what he calls a fine-tuning argument for naturalism. It’s important to keep in mind that Oerter doesn’t actually believe that this argument is a good argument for naturalism. Rather, he thinks it’s useful for showing what’s wrong with the fine-tuning argument for theism. Rather … Robert Oerter’s Fine-Tuning Argument for Naturalism
Thoughts about Plantinga’s Interesting Paper on “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience”
I’ve been studying Plantinga’s very interesting paper, “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience.” (See here for Ex-Apologist’s very brief post about it.) Plantinga’s stated goal is to show that metaphysical naturalism cannot accommodate realism about moral obligation by “displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing” that metaphysical naturalism can accommodate moral realism, viz., … Thoughts about Plantinga’s Interesting Paper on “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience”
Feser Insults (Insulted?) Parsons Again
If Edward Feser is not yet the JP Holding of theistic philosophers, he seems to be well on his way. I don’t always read his blog, but his latest item caught my attention. “God and Man at HuffPro“ In that brief article, he links to this older article: “So you think you understand the cosmological … Feser Insults (Insulted?) Parsons Again
How the Distinction between Deductive vs. Inductive Arguments Can Mask Uncertainty
Everyone who has taken a philosophy 101 class has learned the distinction between deductive and inductive arguments. It goes like this. Only deductive arguments may be valid; an argument is valid if and only if the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its premises. Otherwise, the argument is invalid. If an argument is … How the Distinction between Deductive vs. Inductive Arguments Can Mask Uncertainty
Jeff Lowder Speaking in London
I will be speaking to the Central London Humanist Group. Here are the details: Topic: Evidence about God: What Apologists Don’t Want You to Know When: Thursday, 28 March at 7pm Where: Conway Hall in central London LINK Your name Your email Subject Your message (optional)