arguments for theism

Is Empathy Just Another Feeling That Can Be Suppressed if Metaphysical Naturalism Is True?

Depending on the particulars, an argument from silence may be logically correct or incorrect. I’ve argued that the most charitable interpretation of arguments from silence is as explanatory arguments. In order to succeed, arguments from silence must successfully show that the non-existence or non-occurrence of the thing in question is a better explanation than rival Is Empathy Just Another Feeling That Can Be Suppressed if Metaphysical Naturalism Is True?

God of the Gaps Arguments

I see the phrase “God-of-the-gaps” (GOTG) argument used a lot in the blogosphere, but people rarely define what they mean. I think GOTG arguments all look something like this. 1. X happens or exists. 2. We have no naturalistic explanation for X, i.e., we have no way to explain X without God. 3. Therefore, God God of the Gaps Arguments

Simplicity, Theism, and Naturalism

In a recent post on his blog, Alexander Pruss presents an interesting argument regarding simplicity, theism, and naturalism. He writes: I have argued elsewhere, as my colleague Trent Dougherty also has and earlier, that when we understand simplicity rightly, theism makes for a simpler theory than naturalism. However, suppose I am wrong, and naturalism is the Simplicity, Theism, and Naturalism

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3

I am exploring a concern about, or potential objection to, Swinburne’s inductive cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God. The objection I have in mind is something like this, for the cosmological argument: Although the one factual premise of Swinburne’s cosmological argument is supposed to be the ONLY contingent factual claim or assumption Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3