Video: The Euthyphro Problem for Divine Command Theory
This video is based on a presentation that I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College (in Glendale Arizona). Your name Your email Subject Your message (optional)
The Object of Moral Concern Problem for Divine Command Theory
Suppose that I steal your laptop on Friday afternoon. As the weekend sets in, I begin to be plagued by guilt. Initially, taking your laptop seemed like a great idea. I need a new computer, and yours is much nicer than mine. It is newer, has a faster processor, more memory, a bigger screen, etc. … The Object of Moral Concern Problem for Divine Command Theory
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence
Here, again, are the two options of the Euthyphro dilemma: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that God commands that we perform them. I have written five parts in this series … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence
Conversation with Dan Norton about Selfishness
Last month I had a pleasant conversation with philosopher Dan Norton. Dan recently started a YouTube channel called “The Selfishness Project.” Our conversation touched on many questions in moral philosophy, such as whether morality is objective or subjective, what it means for morality to be objective or subjective, and what it means to act out … Conversation with Dan Norton about Selfishness
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 5: Is there a way out?
Recall the two options of the Euthyphro dilemma: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that God commands that we perform them. In previous posts in this series I explained what the … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 5: Is there a way out?
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 4: Why is it a dilemma?
In part I of this series, I showed that the Euthyphro dilemma consists of the following two options: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that God commands that we perform them. … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 4: Why is it a dilemma?
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 3: Reasons and Moral Obligations
This is the third in a series of posts about the Euthyphro dilemma. In this series, I am making a case that the Euthyphro dilemma provides the basis of a definitive objection to DCT. This case will take several posts to present fully. In part 1, I explained what the two options of the dilemma … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 3: Reasons and Moral Obligations
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 2: Arbitrariness
In the first post in this series, I pointed out that when we apply the Euthyphro question to DCT, we get the following options (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 2: Arbitrariness
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 1: The Question and the Options
The Euthyphro dilemma has been used for centuries as a basis for undermining theories that account for moral value in virtue of God’s will, activities, and/or nature, including various versions of Divine Command Theory (DCT)[1]. Beginning in the latter half of the 20th century the arguments directed against DCT that are grounded in this dilemma … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 1: The Question and the Options
Morality does not depend on the existence of God
Some people believe (or claim to believe) that if God does not exist, then there are no objective moral truths (e.g., truths about what we are morally obligated to do or refrain from doing). This claim is false as the following argument shows: (1) Torturing a child causes the child to experience severe suffering. (2) … Morality does not depend on the existence of God