Now that I have evaluated Peter Kirby’s first argument from silence against the historicity of the empty tomb of Jesus, I now want to consider his second argument from silence against the historicity of the empty tomb of Jesus (hereafter, “Kirby’s second argument”). According to that argument, the absence of evidence that Christians venerated Jesus’ burial place is evidence against the historicity of the empty tomb.

Kirby’s Second Argument Formulated (as an Explanatory Argument)

We are now in a position to formally state Kirby’s argument. 

B: The Relevant Background Evidence

B1.The historicity of Jesus, i.e., the New Testament Jesus is based upon a real historical individual. (Note: this proposition should not be interpreted as making any claims about the various deeds attributed to Jesus.)

B2. Jesus died by crucifixion.

E: The Evidence to be Explained

E. There is an absence of evidence (in both the New Testament and other earliest Christian writings) that Christians regarded the place where Jesus had been buried as having any special significance (i.e., practice of tomb veneration, meeting for worship at Jesus’ tomb, etc.).

H: The Proposed Explanatory Hypothesis and Its Alternatives

H: Jesus’ tomb was empty after his death and burial.

~H: Jesus’ tomb was not empty after his death and burial.

Kirby’s Argument Formulated

(1) E is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E | B) is close to 1.

(2) H is not intrinsically much more probable than ~H, i.e., Pr(H | B) is not much more probable than Pr(H | B). [Note: Kirby doesn’t address the intrinsic probability of H at all, but I am adding this to be maximally charitable.]

(3) E is antecedently much more probable on ~H than on H, i.e., Pr(E | ~H & B) >! Pr(E | H & B).

(4) Therefore, other evidence held equal, H is probably false, i.e., Pr(H | B & E) < 0.5.

Kirby’s Defense of (3)

In defense of (3), Kirby writes this.

I agree that it would be most reasonable to conclude that early Christians did not know that Jesus was resting in his tomb because we would then expect tomb veneration. I agree that this is evidence against knowledge of a full tomb. But I would state further that this is equally evidence against knowledge of an empty tomb. It is plain to see that the site of the tomb of Jesus would become a site of veneration and pilgrimage among early Christians regardless of whether it were full or empty. The factors of nagging doubt, pious curiousity, [sic] and liturgical significance would all contribute towards the empty tomb becoming a site of intense interest among Christians.

Let’s make a distinction between two related but distinct hypotheses:

H1: Jesus’ tomb was empty after his death and burial.

H2: Early Christians knew the location of Jesus’ tomb.

And H2 can be decomposed into at least two sub-hypotheses:

H2.1: Early Christians knew the location of Jesus’ full tomb.

H2.2: Early Christians knew the location of Jesus’ empty tomb.

With this distinction in mind, then, let’s parse Kirby’s defense of (3).

I agree that it would be most reasonable to conclude that early Christians did not know that Jesus was resting in his tomb because we would then expect tomb veneration. I agree that this is evidence against knowledge of a full tomb.

In other words, Pr(E | H2.1) > Pr(E | ~H2.1).

But I would state further that this is equally evidence against knowledge of an empty tomb. (italics mine)

In other words, Pr(E | H2.1) = Pr(E | H2.2).

It is plain to see that the site of the tomb of Jesus would become a site of veneration and pilgrimage among early Christians regardless of whether it were full or empty. The factors of nagging doubt, pious curiousity, [sic] and liturgical significance would all contribute towards the empty tomb becoming a site of intense interest among Christians.

In other words, Pr(E | H2.2) > Pr(E | ~H2.2).

Thus, Kirby’s defense of (3) may be formulated as follows.

(5) Pr(E | H2.1) > Pr(E | ~H2.1).

(6) Pr(E | H2.1) = Pr(E | H2.2).

(7) Pr(E | H2.2) > Pr(E | ~H2.2).

(8) Therefore, E is antecedently much more probable on ~H1 than on H1, i.e., Pr(E | ~H1 & B) >! Pr(E | H1 & B).

As this formal analysis makes obvious, the argument is a non sequitur. Not only does the conclusion not follow from the premises, but H1 isn’t even explicitly included in the premises! As it stands, then, Kirby’s defense of (3) is, at best, incomplete. Indeed, in light of (6), one obvious reply to Kirby’s argument is that Pr(E | H) = Pr(E | ~H). In plain English, if E is “equally” evidence against both early Christians having knowledge of a full tomb and early Christians having knowledge of an empty tomb, then why isn’t it also the case that E is “equally” probable on both an empty tomb and its denial? (For the record, I’m not claiming that I believe this inference is a good one; rather, I’m simply pointing out that Kirby says nothing regarding this reply.) I conclude that Kirby’s defense of (3) is, at best, incomplete.

On the other hand, I do wonder if there is an inductively correct argument from silence (regarding tomb veneration) against the empty tomb. In other words, although I think Kirby’s second argument (as currently written) fails, I do not rule out the possibility that there may be another version of the argument which succeeds. Perhaps in a future post I can try to reformulate Kirby’s argument in an attempt to strengthen it.