WHERE WE ARE

In the third edition of Reasonable Faith (hereafter: RF3), William Craig presents three objections against Spinoza’s second objection against miracles, as we saw in my previous post on this subject.

Craig’s first objection, lets call it the Insignificant Impact Objection, is an attempt to downplay the significance of Spinoza’s second objection against miracles. Craig portrays Spinoza’s objection as only impacting an argument for the existence of God. But Craig is mistaken on this point. Spinoza’s second objection, if successful, rules out the possibility of identifying any event as being a miracle. This strong conclusion, if correct, demolishes any arguments for any Christian belief whatsoever by Christian apologists that are based on an alleged miracle. If we cannot determine whether an event is a miracle, then no argument based on an alleged miracle can be a strong or solid argument.

Furthermore, because the occurrence of miracles is the basis for claims by Christian apologists about the specific motivations and purposes of God, and because most arguments for the existence of God are based on assumptions about the specific motivations and purposes of God, our inability to identify an event as being a miracle, also demolishes most arguments for the existence of God. It is not the case that only the “Argument from Miracles” for the existence of God is impacted by Spinoza’s second objection to miracles.

The potential impact of Spinoza’s second objection against miracles is very significant, contrary to Craig’s attempt to downplay this objection as being insignificant. Therefore, Craig’s Insignificant Impact Objection fails.

Craig’s second objection, let’s call it the Doctrinal-Context Objection, concedes that a bare description of an event can leave it ambiguous whether the event was brought about by God, but that when we add the “doctrinal context” to that description, this will make it clear whether the event was brought about by God or not. According to Craig, the apparent religious ambiguity of some events is the result of inadequate descriptions of the event that leave out important aspects of the context of the event.

Craig’s third objection, let’s call it the Atheists Don’t Believe in Angels Objection, asserts that atheists would not take seriously the idea that an alleged miracle was caused by an angel or a demon, because atheists don’t believe that angels or demons exist. The alternative explanation offered by Spinoza about alleged miracles has no plausibility, at least for modern unbelievers.

In this current post, I will critically evaluate Craig’s second objection to Spinoza’s second objection against miracles.

CRAIG’S DOCTRINAL-CONTEXT OBJECTION

Craig’s second objection concerns an alleged way around the problem presented by Spinoza’s second objection against miracles:

Nevertheless, Christian apologists were very concerned about how to show in any particular case that a miracle was not demonic but divine. I think that their answer to this problem constitutes one of the most important and enduring contributions to the discussion of miracles. They held that the doctrinal context of the miracle makes it evident if the miracle is truly from God. In this way they drew attention to the religio-historical context in which the miracle occurred as the key to the interpretation of that miracle. This is very significant, for a miracle without a context is inherently ambiguous.

(RF3, p.266)

Samuel Clarke is one of the key Christian apologists that Craig has in mind here:

From the miracle itself taken as an isolated event, it is impossible to determine whether it was performed directly by God or by an angel or demonic spirit. But, according to Clarke, the key to distinguishing between demonic miracles and divine miracles (whether done directly or indirectly by God) is the doctrinal context in which the miracle occurs.

(RF3, p. 252)

According to these Christian apologists and according to William Craig, a bare description of an alleged event can make it ambiguous whether the event was brought about by God or by some other supernatural being, but if we add the “doctrinal context” or the “religio-historical context” to that description, then we will be able to determine whether the event in question was “truly from God” or not, whether the event was intentionally brought about by God or by some other supernatural being.

But what does Craig mean by the “doctrinal context” or the “religio-historical context” of an event? He does not define either of these unclear terms. However, Craig does provide some clarification about what these terms mean, particularly when he describes Samuel Clarke’s view of miracles:

…according to Clarke, the key to distinguishing between demonic miracles and divine miracles (whether done directly or indirectly by God) is the doctrinal context in which the miracle occurs. If the miracle is done in support of a doctrine that is contrary to moral law, then we may be sure that it is not a divine miracle. Thus, in order for an event to be a divine miracle, the doctrinal context of the event must be at least morally neutral. If two miracles are performed in support of two contrary doctrines, each morally neutral in itself, then the doctrine supported by the greater miracle ought to be accepted as of divine origin.

(RF3, p. 252-253)

In the above passage, Craig spells out a necessary condition for an event to be correctly identified as a true miracle, as an event that was brought about by God:

An event was brought about by God ONLY IF it was not done in support of a doctrine that is contrary to moral law.

There are several problems with this proposed necessary condition:

PROBLEM 1: What about events that are NOT done in support of any doctrine at all?

Christian apologists and philosophers often mistakenly assume that God’s only motivation or purpose is to teach human beings correct theology. This assumption is idiotic. A perfectly good deity would prefer humans to have true theological beliefs rather than false ones, but this is just one of millions of possible good things that a perfectly good deity might want to cause or bring about.

A perfectly good deity, would, for example also want to alleviate human suffering, human disability, human disease, injury and death, not to mention preferring humans to have true beliefs about the natural world (geology, biology, astonomy, chemistry, physics) rather than false beliefs, and true beliefs about other humans (history, geography, psychology, sociology, anthropology, ecomonics, political science) rather than false beliefs. A perfectly good deity would also care about the well-being of animals. In short, the motivations and purposes of a perfectly good deity would be countless. So, to limit God’s motivations to that of teaching correct theological beliefs to humans is absurd and mistaken.

If God were to intervene in the natural world in order to alleviate the suffering of a starving child by creating a hot and nutritious meal out of thin air for the child, this would be a miracle, even if God’s motivation for doing this was simply to alleviate the suffering of that child. In such a case, there would be no “doctrinal context”, because God’s purpose in that instance would be something other than teaching humans correct theological doctrine. Because teaching correct theology is only one of countless good motivations that God could have for intervening in the natural world, the test proposed by Craig would be irrelevant, and thus worthless, in most instances.

PROBLEM 2: This is only a NECESSARY CONDITION but is clearly not a SUFFICIENT CONDITION, so, at best, it only rules out some alleged miracles.

Demons and angels can also perform supernatural actions that are NOT “in support a doctrine that is contrary to moral law.” Angels, being generally good, would usually try to avoid performing actions that are “in support of a doctrine that is contrary to moral law.” So, the test here does not distinguish between events brought about by God and events brought about by angels.

Demons, being evil, would not particularly mind if an action they performed supported “a doctrine that is contrary to moral law,” but that is only one of countless evil purposes that a demon might want to accomplish. Just as teaching correct theology is only one of countless good purposes that God might have for performing an action, so promoting “a doctrine that is contrary to moral law” is only one of countless evil purposes that a demon might have for performing an action.

For example, suppose that a demon wants a specific starving child to continue to suffer from hunger and malnutrition, and suppose that some kind person provides a hot and nutritious meal for the child. The demon might cause that meal to vanish into thin air, thus leaving the child hungry. The purpose of the demon in this case might simply have been to extend the suffering of that particular child, and the demon might not have the intention of teaching any humans “a doctrine that is contrary to moral law,” at least not by that particular supernatural action of making the meal vanish into thin air.

Furthermore, although demons are generally evil beings (by definition), there is no logical necessity that every single action performed by a demon must have an evil purpose. There is no reason to think that a demon would be completely unable to ever perform a morally neutral action, or even to sometimes perform a morally good action. So, there is no reason why a demon could not, on some occasion, perform an action for the purpose of supporting a doctrine that is in keeping with moral law.

Thus, the test proposed by Craig would not help us to distinguish between instances where a supernatural event was brought about by a demon for the purpose of supporting a doctrine that is NOT contrary to moral law, and instances where the supernatural event was brought about by God for the purpose of supporting a doctrine that is NOT contrary to moral law.

PROBLEM 3: Knowing that an event was “done in support of a doctrine” requires knowing who brought the event about and knowing the motivations and purposes of the person who brought the event about.

So, if God brought about event X, we must first determine that it was God who brought about event X, and also determine what God’s motivations or purposes are, and only then would we be in a position to determine whether the event was “done in support of a doctrine”.

But if that is the case, then it is more difficult and more challenging to determine whether an event was “done in support of a doctrine” by God than it is to determine that the event was brought about by God! But the whole point is to be able to distinguish a true miracle from a fake miracle, to determine whether the event in question was brought about by God or by some other supernatural being. The suggested criterion requires that we first figure out WHO brought about the event in question and then apply some test concerning whether the event supports some doctrine or not. But if we know the answer to the first question, then we have already determined whether or not God brought the event about.

The whole point is to try to determine whether a particular event was brought about by God or not. If we cannot apply Craig’s proposed test until AFTER we determine that God caused that event, then we are stuck reasoning in a circle. In short, determining whether an event was “done in support of doctrine X” is a greater and more difficult task than determining whether God brought about the event in question! So Craig’s suggested criterion is of no use or value. It does not help us to determine whether God brought about some particular event.

In short, the proposed criterion is CIRCULAR. One must already know whether God brought about the event in question in order to use the proposed criterion, but in that case, we have no need for the criterion.

PROBLEM 4: The problem of evil is often regarded by Christian believers as an insignificant objection to the existence of God on the grounds that it is very difficult for humans to correctly evaluate the moral goodness or badness of the creator’s plans and actions. But the necessary condition proposed by Craig assumes that it is relatively easy for humans to correctly evaluate the moral goodness or badness of the plans and actions of an invisible supernatural being.

If humans are not in a position to confidently and correctly evaluate the moral goodness of the creator of our universe (in relation to the problem of evil), then humans are not in a position to confidently and correctly evaluate the moral goodness of the supernatural person or being who brought about an alleged miracle.

If it is relatively easy for humans to determine the moral goodness (or moral badness or moral neutrality) of a doctrine that is allegedly “supported” or “evidenced” by a particular alleged miracle, then it should also be relatively easy for humans to determine the moral goodness (or moral badness or moral neutrality) of the natural things, creatures, and phenomena that are alleged products of a divine creator. In short, accepting this objection by Craig might well make the problem of evil a much bigger problem than most Christian believers think it is.

PROBLEM 5: The criterion of “the greater miracle” is UNCLEAR and DUBIOUS

According to Clarke, if there are two alleged “miracles” and both satisfy the necessary condition of being “at least morally neutral”, but one of the events supports morally neutral doctrine X, and the other supports morally neutral doctrine Y and doctrine X is contrary to doctrine Y, then we can determine which event is a true miracle (i.e. from God) by determining which of the events was “the greater miracle”.

What makes some event “the greater miracle” compared to another event? This is a vague and unclear idea. Is causing a large boulder to levitate a “greater miracle” than causing a small pebble to levitate? Both events clearly violate the laws of physics. What about causing a large boulder to levitate vs. causing a car (of equal weight) to levitate? Which of these events would be the “greater miracle”? How about causing a large boulder to levitate vs. causing a snowball to burst into flame? Which is the “greater miracle”? It is unclear how we are supposed to objectively and correctly assess the “greatness” of an alleged miracle.

Also, once we determine that, for example, event X was “the greater miracle” compared to event Y, we can then conclude that Y was not a miracle at all. But then it would no longer be true that X was “the greater miracle”, because Y was not any sort of miracle to begin with; Y was a fake miracle, a pseudo-miracle. So, in comparing X with Y were were NOT comparing one miracle with another miracle. Therefore, X cannot be “the greater miracle” compared to Y.

Furthermore, this UNCLEAR criterion appears to assume that God has the power to change the past, which would involve a logical contradiction. Assuming that the “greatness” of a miracle constitutes a continuum from zero greatness to infinite greatness, presumably God does NOT always opt for infinite greatness in every miracle that he brings about. So, once God performs a true miracle with a particular degree of “greatness”, any other supernatural being is free to perform a fake miracle with a higher degree of “greatness” than the miracle just performed by God.

If that supernatural being performed this fake miracle with a higher degree of “greatness” in support of a doctrine that is contrary to the doctrine supported by the true miracle just performed by God, then Clarke’s criterion would guide us to identify the fake miracle as being from God, and the true miracle peformed by God as being a fake miracle. But not even God can go back in time and re-do his previous miracle to give it a higher degree of “greatness” than he previously chose to give it.

PROBLEM 6: THE CHALLENGE OF DETERMINING THE “MEANING” OF AN EVENT

The test that Craig is promoting for use in distinguishing between true miracles and fake miracles is problematic because, as pointed out in Problem 1, it is likely that most alleged miracles were NOT brought about in order to teach or “support” some theological doctrine. As Problem 3 points out, it is very difficult just to determine whether teaching or “supporting” some doctrine is the intended purpose of an alleged miracle.

In order to actually apply Craig’s proposed test, we not only have to determine that teaching or supporting some (unspecified) theological doctrine was the intended purpose of an event, but we have to determine the SPECIFIC CONTENT of the doctrine in question! Without knowing the specific content, there is no hope of correctly determining whether the doctrine is morally good, morally bad, or morally neutral.

Even though Christians have explicit written guidance, such as the Ten Commandments from Moses, and the Sermon on the Mount from Jesus, they still disagree about many important moral issues. This is because there is some vagueness and unclarity in the Ten Commandments and in the teachings of Jesus concerning many moral issues. But if Christian believers often cannot agree on moral issues even when they have written guidance from Moses and Jesus, then we cannot expect Christian believers to have the same interpretation of the meaning of an alleged miracle.

Events do NOT describe themselves; people describe and characterize events. People with different beliefs and values (including Christian believers who disagree among themselves about many beliefs and values) will assign different meanings to the same event. This is true of biblical miracles. Christian scholars and writers often assign different meanings to the same biblical miracle. If Christians cannot agree on the meanings of biblical miracles, how can they expect that humans in general (having an even greater diversity of beliefs and values) will be able to agree on the specific theological meaning of some event that is alleged to be a miracle? In most cases, such general agreement will not occur, making any specific proposed interpretation subjective and dubious.

A BAD DEFINITION OF THE TERM “MIRACLE”

Craig approvingly quotes a definition of the term “miracle” put forward by Samuel Clarke:

Hence, the correct theological definition of a miracle is: “a work effected in a manner unusual, or different from the common and regular Method of Providence, by the interposition of God himself, or some intelligent Agent superior to Man, for the proof or Evidence of some particular Doctrine, or in attestation to the Authority of some particular Person.” Jesus’ miracles thus prove that he was “a Teacher sent from God” who had “a Divine Commission.”

(RF3, p. 253)

On this definition, supernatural actions performed by demons or finite gods could count as miracles. Although the word “miracle” is sometimes applied to the supernatural actions of demons and finite gods, such miracles are obviously of no use in helping humans to determine whether some person was “a Teacher sent from God”. A Demon or a finite god would be, or might well be, an “intelligent Agent superior to Man”. But supernatural actions of a demon or finite god are unlikely to correctly indicate which human is “a Teacher sent from God”.

Only supernatural actions performed by God could give us reliable guidance about which human (if any) is “a Teacher sent from God”. So, it is clearly a big mistake to define the term “miracle” broadly as a supernatural action performed by “some intelligent Agent superior to Man”. If miracles are to used as reliable guidance for determining whether someone is “a Teacher sent from God”, then only supernatural actions performed by God will be useful to us.

Furthermore, it is absurd to limit God’s purposes and motivations to teaching correct theology, as the above definition does. Teaching correct theology is only one of countless good purposes that God, if God exists, would have. If God performs a supernatural action in order to bring about some good event or outcome in this world, then that is a miracle whether or not the good thing that God brings about has anything to do with correct theology. If God performs a supernatural action to heal a sick child, then that would be a miracle whether or not God was attempting to teach some correct theological doctrine to somebody by healing that child.

So, the above definition is clearly wrong on two basic points. It is wrong in specifying the agent of a miracle too broadly as “some intelligent Agent superior to Man”, and it is wrong in specifying the purpose of a miracle as always being very narrowly limited to providing “Evidence of some particular doctrine” (which would include the doctrine that some particular person was “a Teacher sent from God”.) Clarke’s definition of “miracle” is a confused and clearly mistaken definition.

Someone who is so clearly mistaken about what the term “miracle” means is very unlikely to have anything worthwhile to say about how to distinguish true miracles from fake miracles.

CONCLUSION

There are a number of serious problems with William Craig’s proposal that we follow Samuel Clarke’s advice and use the “doctrinal context” of an event to determine whether an alleged miracle is a true miracle (brought about by God) or a fake miracle (brought about by some other supernatural being or person with supernatural power).

This is not surprising given that Samuel Clarke’s definition of the term “miracle” is so clearly and fundamentally mistaken.

Because of the serious confusion, errors, unclarity, and logical problems with the idea of using “doctrinal context” to distinguish between true miracles and fake miracles, Craig’s second objection against Spinoza’s second objection to miracles fails.