WHERE WE ARE

In the first post of this series, I conceded that Spinoza’s primary objection against miracles fails, because Spinoza mistakenly assumed that the laws of nature were deterministic. In the 20th century, science has shown that some laws of nature involve probability and chance, and that natural phenomena can sometimes be random.

However, a different objection against miracles by Spinoza seems more promising: humans cannot determine when an event was caused by God as opposed to some other supernatural being (e.g. a demon, an angel, a finite god, or a human with supernatural powers). I added to this point by Spinoza the claim that the term “miracle” should be understood to imply that the event in question was intentionally brought about by God. The combination of Spinoza’s point and my definition of “miracle” implies that humans cannot determine whether an alleged miracle is an actual miracle, so humans are not capable of identifying an event as being a miracle.

I pointed out that this objection to miracles is strongly implied by the Bible, in both the Old Testament and the New Testament, because both Old Testament prophets and Jesus’ teachings in the New Testament point to the possibility of false prophets and false miracles. This creates a concern in believers about how to distinguish between true prophets and false prophets and about how to distinguish between true miracles and false miracles. This biblically encouraged concern is the basis for the objection that Spinoza makes against miracles.

CRAIG’S FIRST OBJECTION

Here is William Craig’s first objection to Spinoza’s second objection against miracles:

Spinoza’s sub-point that miracles could not prove the existence of God, but only of a lesser being, did not strike against most of the Christian apologists because they were not trying to prove the existence of God. Having proved or presupposed the existence of God, they used miracles chiefly to show that Christian theism was true.

(RF3, p.266)

I have already indicated why I think Craig is wrong here. Spinoza’s point about not being able to determine whether it was God who brought about an event implies that we are not able to determine whether an event is a miracle, given the definition of “miracle” in which it is a necessary condition of being a “miracle” that an event was intentionally brought about by God.

Given that understanding of what constitutes a miracle, no Christian apologist can use miracles as the basis for proving any Christian theological belief, because our inability to determine whether an event was intentionally brought about by God means we are unable to determine whether any event is a miracle.

Another problem here is that most arguments for the existence of God are based on the assumption that God is a perfectly morally good person, by definition, and are also based on some more specific assumption(s) about God’s motivations or purposes. But human beings are IGNORANT about the motivations or purposes of God.

Miracles are an important way that humans could potentially LEARN about the specific motivations or purposes of God (above and beyond the general idea that God is, by definition, perfectly morally good). But if humans are unable to identify any events as being miracles, then that important way of LEARNING about the specific motivations or purposes of God is ruled out, leaving humans IGNORANT about God, and leaving the arguments of Christian apologists with premises or assumptions that we cannot determine to be true or false.

Thus, if Spinoza’s objection holds up, then most arguments for the existence of God are based on assumptions that we humans are unable to determine to be true or false, at least not by means of identifying some events as being miracles.

The other potential way of determining the specific motivations and purposes of God is by means of divine revelation, but there are many different books that are alleged to be revelations from God, and those books frequently contradict each other. So, we need a way to determine which of the alleged revelations is a true revelation from God.

The way to make this determination, according to Christian apologists, is to see which book or books are supported by miracles. But if humans are, as Spinoza argues, unable to determine whether an event was intentionally brought about by God, as opposed to some other supernatural being, then humans are unable to determine which of the allegedly inspired books was actually inspired by God.

Thus, our IGNORANCE about the occurrence of miracles also causes our IGNORANCE about which books, if any, are divinely inspired, and thus causes our IGNORANCE about the motivations or purposes of God. Therefore, our ignorance about miracles implies that most arguments by Christian apologists for the existence of God are based on assumptions that we humans cannot determine to be true or false.

Furthermore, the claim that book X was divinely inspired presupposes that God exists, because there can be no divinely inspired books if there is no God. So any argument for the existence of God that is based on an assumption that is supported by pointing to a statement or passage from an allegedly inspired book X is an argument that uses circular reasoning, and thus is a bad argument.

Spinoza’s second objection to miracles thus not only demolishes many arguments of Christian apologists concerning various Christian theological beliefs, but also demolishes most of their arguments for the existence of God, because most arguments for the existence of God are based on assumptions about specific motivations and purposes of God.

CRAIG’S SECOND OBJECTION

Craig’s second objection concerns an alleged way around the problem presented by Spinoza’s second objection against miracles:

Nevertheless, Christian apologists were very concerned about how to show in any particular case that a miracle was not demonic but divine. I think that their answer to this problem constitutes one of the most important and enduring contributions to the discussion of miracles. They held that the doctrinal context of the miracle makes it evident if the miracle is truly from God. In this way they drew attention to the religio-historical context in which the miracle occurred as the key to the interpretation of that miracle. This is very significant, for a miracle without a context is inherently ambiguous.

(RF3, p.266)

According to these Christian apologists and according to William Craig, a bare description of an alleged event might make it ambiguous whether the event was brought about by God or by some other supernatural being, but if we add the “doctrinal context” or the “religio-historical context” to that description, then we will be able to determine whether the event in question was “truly from God” or not, whether the event was intentionally brought about by God or by some other supernatural being.

CRAIG’S THIRD OBJECTION

Here is Craig’s third objection to Spinoza’s second objection against miracles:

Spinoza’s concern with lesser spiritual beings like angels and demons would probably not trouble many contemporary minds. Such beings are part of the furniture, so to speak, of a wider theistic worldview, so that no atheist today would seriously concede the Gospel miracles and yet maintain they were performed by angels. It would not seem unwarranted to infer that if such events are genuine miracles, then they were wrought by God.

(RF3, p.266)

Atheists don’t believe in angels or demons, according to Craig, so they would not take seriously the characterization of an event as having been caused by an angel or by a demon. If an atheist could be persuaded that a particular event had a supernatural cause, the atheist would probably accept the explanation that the event was intentionally brought about by God.

TO BE CONTINUED…

In the next part of this series, I will critically evaluate Craig’s second objection to Spinoza’s second objection against miracles.