CRAIG’S 20TH-CENTURY CASE AGAINST THE SWOON THEORY

In the 20th Century, the Christian apologist William Craig made a case against the Swoon Theory (which he refers to as the “Apparent Death Theory”) in these books:

• The Son Rises (1981)
• Apologetics: An Introduction (1984)
• Reasonable Faith, Revised Edition (1994)

This case consisted of three objections:

• Craig’s Objection #1: Jesus’ Physical Injuries
• Craig’s Objection #2: The Sickly Jesus Objection
• Craig’s Objection #3: The Deceptive Jesus Objection

Craig’s Objection #2, the Sickly Jesus Objection, is the same as Objection #5 against the Swoon Theory presented by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli in their Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA).

In Chapter 3 of my upcoming book Thinking Critically about the Resurrection of Jesus, Volume 1: The Resuscitation of the Swoon Theory (hereafter: TCAR1), I show that HCA Objection #5 fails, so there is no need to do a careful analysis and evaluation of Craig’s Objection #2 because I have previously shown that the Sickly Jesus Objection fails.

So, in Chapter 6 of my book TCAR1, I focus on Craig’s Objection #1, and Craig’s Objection #3, and I show that those two objections against the Swoon Theory also fail. Since all three of Craig’s objections in his 20th-century case against the Swoon Theory fail, it is clear that his 20th-century case against the Swoon Theory fails.

CRAIG’S 21ST-CENTURY CASE AGAINST THE SWOON THEORY

Sometime in the last decade of the 20th century, Craig modified his case for the resurrection of Jesus and also modified his cases against various skeptical alternative theories, such as the Swoon Theory, as I argue in this previous post:

William Craig’s 21st-Century Case Against the Swoon Theory

Craig’s 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory appears in at least two of his more recent books:

• Reasonable Faith, 3rd Edition (2008, p.373-374; hereafter: RF3)
• Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? (2019, p.67-69)

Craig’s 21st-century case adds a number of objections, drops one of his previous objections (the Deceptive Jesus Objection), and includes one objection that is new and unique to Craig (the Contrary to Jewish Thought Objection).

Craig’s 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory includes eight significant objections. Six of those objections correspond to objections presented by Kreeft and Tacelli in HCA:

• HCA Objection #7: Who Moved the Stone?
• HCA Objection #5: The Sickly Jesus Objection (same as Craig’s Objection #2 in TSR)
• HCA Objection #1: The Deadliness of Roman Crucifixion.
• HCA Objection #3: Blood and Water.
• HCA Objection #4: Winding Sheets and Entombment.
• HCA Objection #8: Where Did Jesus Go?

In my book TCAT1, I show that all six of these objections against the Swoon Theory FAIL.

There are two other objections in Craig’s 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory in RF3:

• Craig’s Objection #1: Jesus’ Physical Injuries (also in TSR)
• Craig’s Contrary to Jewish Thought Objection (the only new objection in RF3)

In Chapter 6 of my book TCAT1, I show that Craig’s Objection #1 (Jesus’ Physical Injuries) FAILS.

Therefore, the only significant objection in Craig’s 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory that I have not shown to FAIL (in my book TCAT1) is Craig’s Contrary to Jewish Thought Objection (hereafter: the CJT Objection).

CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF CRAIG’S CJT OBJECTION

For my careful analysis of Craig’s Contrary to Jewish Thought Objection (CJT), see this post:

Careful Analysis of Objections to the Swoon Theory: Objection #10 (Jewish Thought)

My critical evaluation of this new and unique objection against the Swoon Theory by Craig will be based on the careful analysis of his argument in the above post.

THE CORE ARGUMENT FOR THE CJT OBJECTION

Let’s begin with the last two inferences in this core argument:

3a. Seeing Jesus alive after his crucifixion (around 30 CE) would lead the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus to believe that Jesus had not died on the cross, not that Jesus was gloriously risen from the dead.

A. According to non-conspiratorial versions of the Swoon Theory, the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus began to believe that Jesus was gloriously risen from the dead as a result of the eleven remaining disciples seeing Jesus alive after his crucifixion (around 30 CE).

THEREFORE:

2a. Non-conspiratorial versions of the Swoon Theory cannot explain why the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus came to believe that Jesus had gloriously risen from the dead.

THEREFORE:

1a. Non-conspiratorial versions of the Swoon Theory have a serious problem that cannot be resolved.

If I were to summarize Craig’s CJT Objection, this sub-argument for the conclusion (1a) would do nicely.   If this argument is a bad argument, then Craig’s CJT Objection fails.

EVALUATION OF THE KEY PREMISE (A)

Premise (A) is a key premise of the argument for premise (2a):

A. According to non-conspiratorial versions of the Swoon Theory, the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus began to believe that Jesus was gloriously risen from the dead as a result of the eleven remaining disciples seeing Jesus alive after his crucifixion (around 30 CE).

Premise (A) is false, so this sub-argument is unsound and should be rejected. That means that we have no good reason to believe that premise (2a) is true, so it might well be false.  Because the core argument is a bad argument, Craig’s CJT Objection against the Swoon Theory fails.

Premise (A) is false, because the Swoon Theory does not claim or imply that all eleven remaining disciples came to believe that Jesus was gloriously risen from the dead.  The Swoon Theory also does not claim or imply that all eleven remaining disciples saw Jesus alive after his crucifixion. 

The Swoon Theory only requires that SOME of the remaining eleven disciples came to believe that Jesus had risen from the dead as a result of seeing Jesus alive after his crucifixion and that those disciples were the primary cause or reason why the belief that God raised Jesus from the dead became widespread among 1st-century Christians.   Thus, premise (A) is false, and the sub-argument for the key premise (2a) is unsound. 

Craig has failed to provide a good reason to believe that the key premise (2a) is true, so (2a) might well be false. Because the key premise (2a) is dubious, we should reject this argument against the Swoon Theory. Therefore, Craig’s CJT Objection against the Swoon Theory fails.

NOTE: This point clearly applies to non-conspiratorial versions of the Swoon Theory.

To insist that every version of the Swoon Theory asserts or implies that all eleven remaining disciples of Jesus came to believe that God had raised Jesus from the dead and that each and every one of the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus had an experience that they each believed was an experience of a living and embodied Jesus sometime after Jesus had been crucified and buried, is to commit the STRAW MAN FALLACY. This is a mischaracterization of the Swoon Theory that makes it easier to attack and to criticize.

Some specific versions of the Swoon Theory might make those assertions or assumptions, but it is unfair and incorrect to assume that all versions of the Swoon Theory make those assertions or assumptions (and unfair and incorrect to assume that all non-conspiratorial versions of the Swoon Theory make those assertions or assumptions).

Because the Swoon Theory does NOT require those assertions or assumptions, premise (A) mischaracterizes the Swoon Theory. Thus, premise (A) is false. Therefore, the sub-argument for premise (2a) is unsound and should be rejected. That means that Craig’s CJT Objection fails, just like all of the other objections that Craig raised in his 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory.

INITIAL EVALUATION OF THE KEY PREMISE (3a)

Another problem with the core argument for Craig’s CJT Objection is that Premise (3a) seems false on its face:

3a. Seeing Jesus alive after his crucifixion (around 30 CE) would lead the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus to believe that Jesus had not died on the cross, not that Jesus was gloriously risen from the dead.

It is, at least, a dubious claim that seeing Jesus alive after his crucifixion would lead all eleven of the remaining disciples to believe that Jesus had not died on the cross.

According to the Gospels, Jesus had repeatedly told his disciples that he would be killed and then would rise from the dead. According to the Gospels, Jesus’ disciples believed Jesus to be a prophet who was speaking the words and the wisdom of God, and that Jesus might be the promised Messiah or savior of the Jews. According to the Gospels, the disciples saw Jesus walk on water, turn water into wine, calm a raging storm with a shout, feed thousands of people with a few loaves of bread and a few fishes, raise the dead, and give sight to the blind.

William Craig and most Evangelical Christians believe all of these Gospel claims about Jesus to be true. But if all of these Gospel claims were true, we would reasonably expect that the disciples would have no doubt that God would raise Jesus from the dead shortly after Jesus was killed. What would be incredible and impossible to explain is if all of this were true and yet all eleven of the remaining disciples upon seeing the living and physically embodied Jesus after his crucifixion then concluded that Jesus must not have died on the cross. That is what would be absurd and unexplainable, NOT that some of them would conclude that God had raised Jesus from the dead. Craig appears to be making a highly implausible claim here.

Craig would probably counter my view that (3a) is very dubious by putting forward the Sickly Jesus Objection, but I have already shown that the Sickly Jesus Objection fails, so the use of that objection here would have no significant force.

All of the rest of the argument for Craig’s CJT Objection has just one purpose: to show that premise (3a) is true. So, we cannot reject premise (3a) at this point, even though (3a) seems dubious, even absurd. We must first consider the rest of Craig’s argument, to see if he has provided a good and solid argument showing that premise (3a) is actually true, contrary to our initial evaluation of it.

If Craig fails to provide a strong and solid argument for (3a), then we should reject the core argument for Craig’s CJT Objection, because (3a) seems to be a very dubious claim. If Craig has provided no good reason to believe (3a), we should conclude that premise (3a) is probably false.

If Craig fails to provide a good reason to believe the key premise (3a) that would be a second serious problem with Craig’s CJT Objection and that would make it clear that this new and unique objection in Craig’s 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory fails.

THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR THE KEY PREMISE (3a)

Although premise (3a) appears to be very dubious, we must consider the argument Craig has provided in support of this premise before we may reasonably reject this premise. Here is the sub-argument given to support (3a):

4a. It is contrary to 1st-century Jewish thought to believe that Jesus had died on the cross (around 30 CE) and then to believe that Jesus had gloriously risen from the dead (less than 48 hours later).

B. The primary influence on the religious beliefs of the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus was 1st-century Jewish thought.

THEREFORE:

3a. Seeing Jesus alive after his crucifixion (around 30 CE) would lead the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus to believe that Jesus had not died on the cross, not that Jesus was gloriously risen from the dead.

The inference here is not a deductively VALID inference, but it does appear to be a reasonable inference; if the premises were both true, that appears to give us a good reason to believe that (3a) is true.

EVALUATION OF PREMISE (B)

Premise (B) seems plausible initially, but it is NOT a historical fact. There is very little information in the New Testament about the lives, activities, and words of the twelve disciples of Jesus.  So, we don’t have enough information to draw firm conclusions about the influences on the religious beliefs of the twelve disciples.

The information that we have seems to support (B), and I’m not aware of information that contradicts (B), so this assumption seems reasonable, but we don’t know that (B) is the case.  Premise (B) is, at best, probably true, so the most this sub-argument could show is that premise (3a) is probably true, assuming that premise (4a) was an established historical fact.

However, there is an important ambiguity in premise (B). Jesus was a 1st-century Jew, and Jesus was an outspoken preacher and teacher of Jewish religious beliefs and values. So, if Jesus taught that X was the case, but X was contrary to the beliefs or values of most 1st-century Jews, then would X be considered to be contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought”?

On the one hand, we are supposing that X is contrary to what most 1st-century Jews believed or valued, so X would appear to be contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought”. However, Jesus was himself a contributor to “1st-century Jewish thought”, so if Jesus taught that X was true, then that would seem to imply that X was NOT contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought”.

It seems obvious that whatever level of influence Jesus had on the thinking of 1st-century Jews in general, he had a very strong influence on the thinking of the Jewish disciples who devoted themselves to following Jesus as a wise and devout Jewish teacher and religious leader. Thus, if Jesus taught something that was contrary to widely-held beliefs or values of 1st-century Jews, then the disciples of Jesus would likely have accepted that teaching of Jesus even though that teaching went against the beliefs and values of most 1st-century Jews.

Therefore, it is crucial to determine the precise meaning of something being contrary to “1st-century Jewish belief”. If Jesus taught some beliefs or values that were contrary to the beliefs or values of most 1st-century Jews, and if those beliefs or values taught by Jesus are categorized as being contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought” (as opposed to being considered as being part of 1st-century Jewish thought), then we should conclude that Jesus’ disciples might well have accepted those beliefs or values, even though they were contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought”, because the teachings of Jesus were a very powerful influence on the thinking of Jesus’ disciples.

On this interpretation of “1st-century Jewish thought”, we should conclude that (B) is false, or that (B) would be false if Jesus had taught some beliefs or values that were contrary to the beliefs or values of most 1st-century Jews. For example, if Jesus had taught that he would be killed and then God would raise him from the dead a short time later, his disciples might well have accepted this belief even if it was contrary to the beliefs or values of most 1st-century Jews. This is a clear counter-example to the key premise (B), if we understand that premise to mean that some of the teachings of Jesus could be correctly categorized as being contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought”.

On one interpretation of “1st-century Jewish thought” the key premise (B) is clearly false, because if we distinguish between the teachings of Jesus and “1st-century Jewish thought”, then it is the teachings of Jesus that are the primary influence on the beliefs and values of his disciples NOT “1st-century Jewish thought”, because the teaching of Jesus would be given greater weight by his disciples than just the general views of most 1st-century Jews.

On the other hand, if the teachings of Jesus are considered to be a part of “1st-century Jewish thought”, then if Jesus taught that he would be killed and that God would raise him from the dead a short time later, it would NOT be contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought” for his disciples to believe that this is actually what happened.

Therefore, on one interpretation of “1st-century Jewish thought”, the key premise (B) would be false, but on the other interpretation, the key premise (4a) would be false. So, the core argument for Craig’s CJT Objection involves the FALLACY OF EQUIVOCATION.

In order for both (B) and (4a) to be true, we must interpret the phrase “1st-century Jewish thought” differently in premise (B) as compared to how we interpret this phrase in premise (4a). But if we assign different meanings to this phrase in (B) as compared to (4a), then the logic of the sub-argument for (3a) will be invalid, and Craig will have failed to give us a good reason to believe that (3a) is true.

The phrase that logically links premise (B) and premise (4a) is: “1st-century Jewish thought”. This phrase has at least two different possible meanings. On one interpretation, the key premise (B) would be false and the core argument would be unsound, for that reason. On the other interpretation, the key premise (4a) would be false, and the core argument would be unsound for that reason. And if we assign different meanings to this phrase in (B) as compared to (4a), then the logic of the argument for (3a) will be invalid. Either way, the core argument should be rejected. Therefore, Craig’s CJT Objection fails, just like all of the other objections in Craig’s 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory.

TO BE CONTINUED…