In his book The God Delusion (hereafter: TGD), Richard Dawkins ends the second chapter (“The God Hypothesis”) with these words:

…before proceeding with my main reason for actively disbelieving in God’s existence, I have the responsibility to dispose of the positive arguments for belief that have been offered through history.

TGD, First Mariner Books edition 2008, p.99

Dawkins attempts to carry out this intellectual responsibility in Chapter 3: “Arguments For God’s Existence”. First up in Chapter 3 is the case for the existence of God made by Thomas Aquinas. According to Dawkins, the arguments of Aquinas on this issue are EASY to refute:

The five ‘proofs’ asserted by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, don’t prove anything, and are easily–though I hesitate to say so, given his eminence–exposed as vacuous.

TGD, p.100

If it were in fact EASY to refute the case for God made by Aquinas, then Dawkins has shown himself to have very little intellectual ability in the philosophy of religion, because he clearly FAILS to accomplish the task of refuting Aquinas’s case for God.

Dawkins believes that it is EASY to refute the case for God by Aquinas because Dawkins is ignorant about the case for God by Aquinas, and in this post, I will argue that Dawkins is ignorant about the case for God by Aquinas because Dawkins did not bother to actually read Aquinas’ case for God.

Dawkins finds it EASY to refute Aquinas because Dawkins presents an INACCURATE and UNFAIR characterization of the case for God made by Aquinas. In short, Dawkins commits the STRAW MAN fallacy against Aquinas and thus fails to refute the case for God that was actually presented by Aquinas.

Before I argue that Dawkins has FAILED to refute the case for God by Aquinas and that Dawkins commits the STRAW MAN fallacy against Aquinas, I want to make an important qualification about his book The God Delusion. Although I believe Dawkins does a horrible job of criticizing the case for God by Aquinas, and that this part of The God Delusion is a great embarrassment to any atheist philosopher who has some familiarity with the actual case for God by Aquinas, that doesn’t mean that The God Delusion is a bad book.

There are other positive aspects of The God Delusion that make it worthwhile reading for anyone who is interested in the question “Does God exist?”. So, I’m not going to recommend that the baby be tossed out with the bathwater. At the end of this post, I have added a SUMMARY EVALUATION of The God Delusion, which includes three positive points and three negative points. The positive points are sufficient to make Dawkins’ book worth reading, in spite of the serious flaws with the book.

NO QUOTATIONS OF AQUINAS

One obvious indication of Dawkins’ failure to refute the case for God by Aquinas is that there is not a single quote from Aquinas anywhere in Dawkins’ supposed refutation of Aquinas. That was a bonehead mistake by Dawkins.

Imagine that some devout Christian believer published a book in 2022 that presents a case for the existence of God. Suppose that at the end of the second chapter of this book the Christian author makes this statement:

…before proceeding with my main reason for believing in God’s existence, I have the responsibility to dispose of the positive arguments for disbelief in God that have been offered through history.

Imagine that at the beginning of Chapter 3 of this book, the Christian author makes this bold assertion:

The argument against the existence of God asserted by Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion, doesn’t prove anything, and is easily exposed as vacuous.

Suppose this Christian author then attempts to refute Dawkins’ argument against the existence of God from The God Delusion but does not bother to provide even a single quotation from The God Delusion or from anything else that Dawkins has written about this issue.

That would clearly be a bonehead move by the Christian author. Dawkins, or some defender of Dawkins, would no doubt complain that it was UNREASONABLE and UNFAIR to attempt to refute Dawkins’ argument against the existence of God without ever providing any quotations from Dawkins’ book or argument. This would be a reasonable complaint.

The Christian believer would presumably have summarized or paraphrased Dawkins’ argument against the existence of God, but that would be an intellectually sloppy way to try to refute Dawkins’ argument. The Christian believer is clearly NOT an unbiased person on this issue. The Christian author has a strong belief in God, and a strong desire to refute atheistic arguments, like the one Dawkins’ presents in The God Delusion. That much would be OBVIOUS to any reader with a modicum of intelligence. So, no intelligent reader is going to TRUST that the Christian author has ACCURATELY and FAIRLY summarized or paraphrased Dawkins’ argument against the existence of God.

The same considerations apply to Dawkins’ treatment of Aquinas. It is obvious to any reader with a modicum of intelligence that Dawkins has a strong disbelief in God, and a strong desire to refute theistic arguments for the existence of God. So, no intelligent reader should simply trust that Dawkins has ACCURATELY and FAIRLY summarized or paraphrased Aquinas’ case for God (however, there are probably millions of readers of The God Delusion who gullibly trusted Dawkins to accurately and fairly summarize and paraphrase Aquinas). The fact that Dawkins simply assumes that his readers will trust that his summary and/or paraphrase of Aquinas’ case for God will be ACCURATE and FAIR, indicates that Dawkins was being sloppy and careless in his writing about Aquinas.

Furthermore, Dawkins set himself up for failure by not providing any quotations from Aquinas. He is dangling a big temptation before himself to commit the STRAW MAN fallacy. If he just distorts Aquinas’ argument a bit when summarizing or paraphrasing it, he can make it EASY to refute the case for God by Aquinas. I will argue in this post that Dawkins fell right into this trap that he set for himself.

THE FIVE WAYS ARE NOT AQUINAS’ CASE FOR GOD

The biggest ERROR in Dawkins’ attempt to refute the case for God by Aquinas is making the following assumption:

The “Five Ways” arguments by Aquinas constitute the case for God by Aquinas.

This assumption is FALSE, and it shows two serious problems with Dawkins’ criticism of the case for God by Aquinas:

• Dawkins is ignorant about the case for God made by Aquinas.
• Dawkins did not actually read the case for God by Aquinas.

Dawkins literally does not know what he is talking about, because he is unfamiliar with the actual case for God that was produced by Aquinas. Since I am quite sure that Dawkins is NOT stupid and that Dawkins would NOT intentionally deceive his readers about the case for God by Aquinas, the only way that I can explain his ignorance of the case for God by Aquinas is that he never actually read the case for God by Aquinas.

THE CASE FOR GOD BY AQUINAS IS “TREATISE ON GOD” IN SUMMA THEOLOGICA

Thomas Aquinas was one of the most prolific philosophers ever to walk on this planet:

His written output is vast, 8 million words at a conservative estimate, the more remarkable as he died aged no more than 50.

The Oxford Guide to Philosophy, 2005, “Aquinas, St Thomas”, p.45

The famous “Five Ways” passage that Dawkins summarizes or paraphrases in The God Delusion, comes from the most important major work by Aquinas: Summa Theologica. The work was originally written in Latin, so it needs to be translated into English for English speakers who do not know Latin. Summa Theologica is a long book. In the Great Books series of important works of Western culture, two volumes are devoted to Aquinas, and both volumes are a translation into English of the Summa Theologica.

Volume 19 of the 1952 edition of Great Books of the Western World is the first volume containing a portion of Summa Theologica and it runs for 826 pages. Volume 20 of Great Books of the Western World contains the rest of Summa Theologica and it runs for 1,085 pages. So, this translation of Summa Theologica contains a total of 1,911 pages!

I can certainly sympathize with Dawkins, who is NOT a philosopher, for not wanting to take the time to read and study nearly 2,000 pages of the Summa Theologica in order to prepare a critique of the case for God by Aquinas. Although philosophy has been my main area of interest and study for four decades, I have no plans (and no desire) to read and study the entire contents of Summa Theologica. However, because Dawkins wanted to publish a book that includes a critique of the case for God by Aquinas, he needed to do more than just read ONE PAGE of the Summa Theologica where Aquinas lays out a very rough summary of five ways to begin a case for the existence of God.

The famous “Five Ways” passage is found under “Question II: The Existence of God”, specifically in a subsection called “Article 3. Whether God Exists?”. The Five Ways passage begins at the end of page 12 (of Volume 19 of the Great Books) and ends prior to the end of page 13, and thus it occupies only about ONE SINGLE PAGE of Summa Theologica. If Dawkins ever held a copy of Summa Theologica in his hands, he should have known that this ONE SINGLE PAGE by Aquinas was NOT the full case for the existence of God by Aquinas. He could have known this simply by briefly looking over the table of contents of Summa Theologica.

It is NOT necessary to read all of the 8 million words written by Aquinas in order to become familiar with his case for God. Furthermore, it is NOT necessary to read the nearly 2,000 pages of his primary work Summa Theologica in order to become familiar with his case for God. However, reading just the ONE SINGLE PAGE of Summa Theologica where Aquinas presents brief summaries about five ways of arguing for the existence of God is NOT sufficient.

How much of Summa Theologica does one need to read and study in order to become familiar with the case for God by Aquinas? One can get a pretty good idea of what is needed by taking 20 to 30 seconds to look over the high-level table of contents of Summa Theologica:

Based on a quick glance at the table of contents for this first volume of Summa Theologica, one could reasonably infer that by reading “I. Treatise on God”, which is about the first 150 pages of the Summa Theologica, one could get a decent understanding of the case for God by Aquinas. The other parts of Summa Theologica do not appear to be directly relevant to the question at issue that Dawkins wants to discuss.

But it is clear that Dawkins did NOT read “I. Treatise on God”, and it is also probably the case that he did not look over the table of contents for this part of Summa Theologica, otherwise he would not have made this statement:

…there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator [the “unmoved mover” referenced in Aquinas’ first way or the “uncaused cause” in the second way] with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness…

TGD, p.101

If Dawkins had bothered to READ the actual case for God presented by Aquinas in the “Treatise on God”, then Dawkins would have KNOWN that Aquinas addresses all three of those divine attributes. In fact, if Dawkins had bothered to take 20 to 30 seconds to look over the table of contents to see the subsections in the “Treatise on God”, then he would have good reason to believe that Aquinas addresses all three of those divine attributes:

Obviously, Question 2 on “The Goodness of God” is relevant to the issue of whether we should ascribe the property of “goodness” to God. Question 14 on “Of God’s Knowledge” would be likely to be relevant to the question of whether we should ascribe the property of omniscience to God, given that “omniscience” means basically the same as being “all-knowing”. Finally, Question 25 on “The Power of God” would be likely to be relevant to the question of whether we should ascribe the property of omnipotence to God, given that “omnipotence” means basically the same as being “all-powerful”. Also, one of the things covered under Question 25 (“The Power of God“) is this: “Article 3. Whether God is Omnipotent?“.

So, not only did Dawkins NOT bother to READ the “Treatise on God”, the very first section of Summa Theologica where Aquinas presents his case for God, but Dawkins apparently did not bother to spend 20 to 30 seconds looking over the table of contents to Summa Theologica, which leads me to suspect that he never actually held a copy of Summa Theologica in his hands.

In any case, whatever the explanation might be, the sentence I quoted above from page 101 of The God Delusion clearly shows that Dawkins is unfamiliar with the actual case for God by Aquinas, which is presented in the first section of Summa Theologica. Dawkins was ignorant about the actual case made by Aquinas for the existence of God.

It also means that Dawkins’ representation of the case for God by Aquinas is INACCURATE and UNFAIR and that in making the following objection against Aquinas, Dawkins committed the STRAW MAN fallacy:

…there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator [the “unmoved mover” referenced in Aquinas’ first way or the “uncaused cause” in the second way] with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness…

TGD, p.101

If Dawkins was aware that Aquinas had in fact given reasons or arguments in support of ascribing the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, and goodness to the unmoved mover, then Dawkins was deliberately lying to his readers! I don’t think that Dawkins is dishonest or a liar, so I can only conclude that he must be ignorant of the actual case for God made by Aquinas in the first section of Summa Theologica (known as “Treatise on God”).

In addition to not bothering to READ “Treatise on God” by Aquinas, Dawkins also did not bother to look over the table of contents for Summa Theologica. Furthermore, there was a third way that Dawkins might have avoided demonstrating his complete ignorance of the case for God by Aquinas, and yet he also clearly failed to take advantage of that third way.

Dawkins could have read some introductory articles about Aquinas’ thinking or case for God. For example, in the one-volume reference book A Critical History of Western Philosophy (1964), there is an article called “Thomas Aquinas” by Knut Tranoy. That article has a subsection that runs from page 109 to page 114 on the thinking of Aquinas about “God”. On page 112 in that subsection on “God” we find a diagram that summarizes the logic of Aquinas’ reasoning about the attributes of God:

This diagram indicates that Aquinas has some reasoning or logic that begins with an abstract metaphysical entity “actus purus” (or pure act – this relates to Aquinas’ first way of arguing for God), and then infers the existence of more specific metaphysical properties, such as “immateriality” and “infinity”, and then from those metaphysical properties infers mental properties such as “intellect” and “knowledge”, and finally from those mental properties infers the properties of “will” and “love”.

So, this philosophy reference book includes a high-level analysis of the reasoning of Aquinas about various properties of God. If Dawkins had read an article like this, that contained a summary or overview about Aquinas’ reasoning about the alleged properties of God, then Dawkins could have avoided exposing his ignorance about Aquinas to the world on page 101 of The God Delusion.

So, Dawkins had at least three different ways to avoid revealing his ignorance about the actual case that Aquinas made for God. Dawkins could have read the first section of Summa Theologica (“Treatise on God”) so that he would become familiar with Aquinas’ case for God, or he could have spent 20 to 30 seconds looking over the table of contents of Summa Theologica, or he could have read some philosophy reference material about Aquinas’ case for God that provided a summary or overview of Aquinas’ reasoning about the alleged properties of God. But, apparently, none of those efforts took place prior to Dawkins writing Chapter 3 of his book The God Delusion.

BUT WAIT…THERE’S MORE

Although Dawkins’ second objection against the case for God by Aquinas clearly FAILS (the above quote from page 101 of TGD is Dawkins’ second objection), because it commits the STRAW MAN fallacy, Dawkins commits another STRAW MAN fallacy by presenting an INACCURATE and UNFAIR characterization of Aquinas’ arguments in the famous Five Ways passage. Dawkins might well have actually read the ONE PAGE of Summa Theologica where Aquinas presents the Five Ways arguments, but he still manages to botch the characterization of those arguments.

Let’s examine Dawkins’ representation of the 1st Way of Aquinas’ Five Ways:

1. The Unmoved Mover. Nothing moves without a prior mover. This leads us to a regress, from which the only escape is God. Something had to make the first move, and that something we call God.

TGD, p.100

Dawkins’ representation of the 1st Way argument spells out five claims:

D1. Nothing moves without a prior mover.

D2. This leads us to a regress.

D3. From which the only escape is God.

D4. Something had to make the first move.

D5. That something we call God.

But the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas involves more than just five claims:

It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in this world some things are in motion. Now whatever is moved is moved by another, for nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is moved; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is moved must be moved by another. If that by which is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 2nd edition, edited by Louis Pojman, pages 4-5, translation by Anton C. Pegis.

At first glance, it seems fairly clear that the 1st Way as presented by Aquinas is significantly longer and more complex than the argument that Dawkins presents as being the 1st Way. It looks like Dawkins has presented an oversimplified and highly compressed version of the 1st Way.

Some of the sentences by Aquinas contain more than one premise or claim, so I am going to separate the various claims in the above quotation, and number each claim:

A1. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in this world some things are in motion.

A2. Now whatever is moved is moved by another.

A3. For nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is moved.

A4. Whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.

A5. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.

A6. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality except by something in a state of actuality.

A7. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.

A8. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects.

A9. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold.

A10. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself.

A11. Therefore, whatever is moved must be moved by another.

A12. If that by which is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another, and that by another again.

A13. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover.

A14. And, consequently, no other mover.

A15. Seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover.

A16. As the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand.

A17. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other.

A18. And this everyone understands to be God.

Because Aquinas announces one of his subconclusions, in claim (A2), prior to the sub-argument for that sub-conclusion, claim (A2) is redundant with claim (A11). So, instead of 18 explicit claims, this argument contains 17 explicit claims. It seems very dubious that Dawkins could ACCURATELY and FAIRLY represent an argument involving 17 explicit claims with an argument involving only 5 brief claims.

It is clear that the last two claims in Dawkins’ version of the 1st Way are paraphrases of the last two claims in the actual 1st Way argument presented by Aquinas:

A17. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other.

=> D4. Something had to make the first move.

A18. And this everyone understands to be God.

=> D5. That something we call God.

Dawkins’ paraphrases of these two claims are not great, but they are not bad either. He did an OK job of paraphrasing the last two claims of the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas. However, that means that Dawkins has attempted to compress 15 different claims in the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas into just three claims. It now seems extremely dubious that Dawkins could have done this and created a FAIR and ACCURATE characterization of the 1st Way.

The first claim in Dawkins’ version of the 1st Way is clearly a paraphrase of a key sub-conclusion of the actual 1st Way argument:

A11. Therefore, whatever is moved must be moved by another.

=> D1. Nothing moves without a prior mover.

This is another OK paraphrase of one claim from the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas.

The second claim in Dawkins’ version of the 1st Way is a paraphrase of another claim in the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas:

A12. If that by which is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another, and that by another again.

=> D2. This leads us to a regress.

So far, 4 of the 5 claims in Dawkins’ version of the 1st Way are paraphrases of four of the 17 claims in the actual 1st Way argument presented by Aquinas. That means, that the one remaining claim or premise in Dawkins’ version must FAIRLY and ACCURATELY represent the 13 remaining claims in the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas:

D3. From which the only escape is God.

Here are the remaining 13 claims from the actual 1st Way argument:

A1. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in this world some things are in motion.

A3. For nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is moved.

A4. Whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.

A5. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.

A6. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality except by something in a state of actuality.

A7. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.

A8. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects.

A9. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold.

A10. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself.

A13. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover.

A14. And, consequently, no other mover.

A15. Seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover.

A16. As the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand.

It should be obvious that Dawkins’ premise (D3) FAILS to FAIRLY and ACCURATELY represent the claims and the reasoning involved in these 13 claims from the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas. Nevertheless, I will point out some specific problems with the idea that premise (D3) FAIRLY and ACCURATELY represents the claims and reasoning connected with the above 13 claims:

• First, (D3) talks about “God”, but NONE of the 13 remaining claims in the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas refers to “God”.

• Second, 6 of the 13 remaining claims in the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas talk about “potentiality” or about “potentially” having a property, but there is no mention of “potentiality” or about “potentially” having a property in premise (D3).

• Third, 6 of the 13 remaining claims in the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas talk about “actuality” or about “actually” having a property or about being “in act”, but there is no mention of “actuality” or about “actually” having a property or about being “in act” in premise (D3).

• Fourth, the concepts of “actuality” and “potentiality” are key concepts in the philosophy of Aquinas.

• Fifth, the 13 remaining claims in the actual 1st Way argument represent sub-arguments or REASONS given in support of the claims that Dawkins paraphrased. Thus, in cutting out these 13 claims, Dawkins is cutting out REASONS that Aquinas gave in support of other premises in the 1st Way argument.

So, in addition to the basic fact that Dawkins foolishly attempts to represent 13 different claims from the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas with just a single brief claim, the above reasons show that Dawkins’ characterization of the 1st Way argument by Aquinas is UNFAIR and INACCURATE.

Therefore, not only has Dawkins created a STRAW MAN by making the false assumption that the ONE SINGLE PAGE of Summa Theologica that presents the Five Ways arguments constitutes the case for God by Aquinas, but Dawkins then proceeds to create another STRAW MAN by presenting a clearly UNFAIR and INACCURATE characterization of the 1st of the Five Ways.

DAWKINS ALSO BUTCHERS THE 2ND WAY ARGUMENT

It should come as no surprise at this point that Dawkins also FAILS to FAIRLY and ACCURATELY characterize the 2nd Way argument by Aquinas, thus committing a third STRAW MAN fallacy against the case for God by Aquinas.

Here is how Dawkins represents the 2nd Way argument:

2. The Uncaused Cause. Nothing is caused by itself. Every effect has a prior cause, and again we are pushed back into regress. This has to be terminated by a first cause, which we call God.

TGD, p.100-101

If we separate out the individual claims, Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way argument contains 5 claims:

D1. Nothing is caused by itself.
D2. Every effect has a prior cause.
D3. And again we are pushed back into regress.
D4. This has to be terminated by a first cause.
D5. Which we call God.

As was the case with the 1st Way argument, the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas contains more than just five claims:

In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of effecient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself: for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in effecient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate cause is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in effecient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first effecient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore, it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 2nd edtion, edited by Louis Pojman, p.5, translation by Anton C. Pegis.

If we separate and number the various claims in this passage, it turns out that the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas consists of 15 explicit claims:

A1. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of effecient causes.
A2. There is no case known…in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself.
A3. Neither is it, indeed, possible [for a thing to be the efficient cause of itself].
A4. For so it would be prior to itself.
A5. Which [a thing being prior to itself] is impossible.
A6. Now in effecient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity.
A7. Because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause.
A8. And [in all effecient causes following in order] the intermediate cause is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only.
A9. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect.
A10. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause.
A11. But if in effecient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first effecient cause.
A12. [Thus, if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity], neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes.
A13. All of which is plainly false.
A14. Therefore, it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause.
A15. To which everyone gives the name of God.

It is already obvious that the actual 2nd Way argument is longer and more complex than the version of the 2nd Way presented by Dawkins. It also seems UNLIKELY that Dawkins has managed to FAIRLY and ACCURATELY capture all 15 claims in the actual 2nd Way argument with his version that consists of only 5 brief claims.

The first thing to notice is that the last two claims of Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way correspond to the last two claims of the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas. The last two claims in Dawkins’ version are paraphrases of the last two claims in the actual argument:

A14. Therefore, it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause.

=> D4. This has to be terminated by a first cause.

A15. To which everyone gives the name of God.

=> D5. Which we call God.

The first premise or claim in Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way is a paraphrase of the third claim in the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas:

A3. Neither is it, indeed, possible [for a thing to be the efficient cause of itself].
=> D1. Nothing is caused by itself.

Although Aquinas does not use the term “regress” in his 2nd Way argument, the third premise or claim in Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way appears to be a paraphrase of the first claim made in the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas:

A1. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of effecient causes.
=> D3. And again we are pushed back into regress.

Efficient causes have “an order” which is a chain of dependency of causes and effects. So, the idea of “an order” of efficient causes is closely connected to the idea of a “regress” into the chain of dependency of causes and effects.

Because 4 of the 5 claims in Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way argument are paraphrases of 4 of the 15 claims in the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas, that means that the one remaining claim in Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way argument must represent ALL of the 11 remaining claims in the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas. It is very unlikely that one brief claim in Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way can FAIRLY and ACCURATELY summarize 11 different claims in the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas.

Here is the one remaining claim in Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way argument:

D2. Every effect has a prior cause.

Here are the 11 remaining claims in the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas:

A2. There is no case known…in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself.
A4. For so it would be prior to itself.
A5. Which [a thing being prior to itself] is impossible.
A6. Now in effecient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity.
A7. Because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause.
A8. And [in all effecient causes following in order] the intermediate cause is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only.
A9. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect.
A10. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause.
A11. But if in effecient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first effecient cause.
A12. [Thus, if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity], neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes.
A13. All of which is plainly false.

Claims (A2), (A4), and (A5) constitute a sub-argument for the KEY PREMISE (A3), and Dawkins’ has paraphrased (A3) with claim (D1). So, claims (A2), (A4), and (A5) are an argument for claim (D1). By cutting out (A2), (A4), and (A5), Dawkins removes the REASON that Aquinas gave in support of (D1). That is both an INACCURATE and UNFAIR characterization of the actual 2nd Way argument that was given by Aquinas.

Claims (A7), (A8), (A9), (A10), (A11), (A12), and (A13) are all part of an argument in support of the KEY PREMISE (A14). As we saw above, Dawkins has paraphrased (A14) with this claim in his version of the 2nd Way:

D4. This has to be terminated by a first cause.

So, in cutting out claims (A7), (A8), (A9), (A10), (A11), and (A13), Dawkins removes the argument that Aquinas gave in support of a KEY PREMISE of the 2nd Way argument, the premise that Dawkins paraphrased as (D4). So, by cutting out those six claims that are part of the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas, Dawkins presents the argument as if there was no support given for (D4), which is clearly FALSE. Therefore, Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way is an UNFAIR and INACCURATE representation of the actual 2nd Way argument.

Furthermore, premise (A6) is one of the 11 remaining claims in the actual 2nd Way argument, and it is clearly a KEY PREMISE in the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas:

A6. Now in effecient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity.

But Dawkins does not provide a paraphrase of this KEY PREMISE. Furthermore, the one remaining claim in Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way that must somehow accurately summarize 11 different claims in the actual 2nd Way argument, does NOT IMPLY that (A6) is the case:

D2. Every effect has a prior cause.

This premise in Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way is logically compatible with it being the case that it is possible for efficient causes to go on to infinity. Therefore, not only does (D2) FAIL to represent ALL of the remaining 11 claims in the actual 2nd Way argument, it FAILS to represent one of those 11 claims that is clearly a KEY PREMISE of the actual 2nd Way argument by Aquinas.

Thus, (D2) completely FAILS to provide a FAIR and ACCURATE representation of the 11 remaining claims from the actual 2nd Way argument. Therefore, Dawkins’ version of the 2nd Way argument is UNFAIR and INACCURATE and constitutes a third STRAW MAN fallacy by Dawkins.

DAWKINS’ IGNORANCE AND INTELLECTUAL SLOPPINESS IS INEXCUSABLE

I have previously shown that there were at least three ways that Dawkins could have avoided his ignorance about the case for God made by Aquinas. So, the STRAW MAN fallacy based on that ignorance was inexcusable.

It is difficult to imagine how Dawkins might be excused for also committing the STRAW MAN fallacy against the 1st Way argument and also against the 2nd Way argument from the famous Five Ways passage in Summa Theologica, given that those arguments only require reading and studying ONE SINGLE PAGE in Summa Theologica. However, I am sure that some of Dawkins’ ardent supporters would try to rationalize and excuse the ignorance and intellectual sloppiness of Dawkins on that point.

One likely defense of Dawkins is that he was NOT writing a scholarly book for philosophers but was writing a popular book for a general audience. For that reason, Dawkins would have understandably been reluctant to provide an actual quotation of, for example, the 1st Way argument by Aquinas, from Summa Theologica. Although that argument consists of only 18 premises or claims, it is long enough and complex enough that such a quotation might well be confusing and too much of an intellectual challenge and strain for many people who have no background in philosophy and who know little or nothing about the philosophy of Aquinas. Many readers might well become frustrated and disgruntled, give up and just stop reading the book at the start of Chapter 3.

I am sympathetic to the difficulty of writing a popular book about an important philosophical issue for a general audience. I am a skeptic because I am a cynic. What I mean by being a “cynic” is that I believe that most people are stupid, ignorant, and unreasonable most of the time. So, I would expect that millions of readers of a popular book about the existence of God would be stupid, ignorant, and unreasonable, and that millions of readers of that book would have an attention span of only about 20 to 30 seconds and would have little hope of understanding the First Way argument just from reading the quotation of that argument.

But this is a general problem with discussing philosophical arguments in a popular book written for a general audience. I’m not saying that nobody should try to write such books. I’m saying that this is a difficult and challenging task. Nevertheless, anyone who takes on such a difficult and challenging task MUST NOT distort the arguments of great philosophers just to make this task EASIER for the author. The duty to be FAIR and ACCURATE in representing the arguments of others, and especially of well-known philosophers, remains a duty even when this makes writing a popular book for a general audience difficult.

Perhaps Dawkins chose to NOT quote from Aquinas, and specifically NOT to quote the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas, because he anticipated that many of his readers would be confused and would not understand what the passage meant. But in that case, it should have been clear to Dawkins that it is NOT EASY to refute Aquinas’ case for God, because it is challenging just to UNDERSTAND some of the arguments of Aquinas that are part of that case for God. But this was not clear to Dawkins:

The five ‘proofs’ asserted by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, don’t prove anything, and are easily–though I hesitate to say so, given his eminence–exposed as vacuous.

TGD, p.100

If Dawkins had quoted the actual 1st Way argument by Aquinas, he would have had to discuss and explain the key concepts of “actuality” and “potentiality” that are at the heart of that argument. Maybe Dawkins did not feel up to this challenge, or maybe he did not think many of his readers would be up to the challenge of learning and understanding these key concepts in the thinking of Aquinas. In either case, there is real difficulty in attempting to refute the case for God by Aquinas, because there is real difficulty in interpreting and understanding some of the arguments that are part of that case.

It might be somewhat excusable to slightly misrepresent the thinking or arguments of a philosopher in a popular book for a general audience if one was simply attempting to introduce the audience to the thinking of that philosopher, as a way of giving the readers a general “feel” for the thinking of that philosopher.

However, Dawkins was not merely attempting to introduce his readers to the thinking of Aquinas. Dawkins was not merely trying to give his readers a general “feel” for the thinking of Aquinas. Dawkins was attempting to REFUTE the case for God by Aquinas. In that context, given that purpose, Dawkins had a serious intellectual duty to be FAIR and ACCURATE in characterizing the case for God by Aquinas, and Dawkins completely FAILED to carry out that intellectual duty.

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SUMMARY EVALUATION OF THE GOD DELUSION

John Loftus wants people to be FAIR to Dawkins’ book The God Delusion when they evaluate this book (see: In Defense of Dawkins and on Being Right ). I agree completely with him on that point, even though we disagree on various points about the quality of Dawkins’ thinking in this book. FAIRNESS is one of the UNIVERSAL STANDARDS of thinking, so anyone who wants to become a strong-sense critical thinker needs to not just be ABLE to be FAIR, but also needs to CARE about FAIRNESS, and if one cares about FAIRNESS, then one will continually strive to be FAIR in one’s thinking. Loftus points out that being FAIR requires that a person “give credit where credit is due”, and that is another point that we completely agree on. So, in my summary evaluation of The God Delusion, I include three positive points about the book, in addition to three negative points about it.

THREE POSITIVE POINTS

P1. Dawkins’ book The God Delusion has encouraged many people to consider and discuss arguments for and against the existence of God. This is a WONDERFUL thing in my view. Considering and discussing arguments for and against the existence of God is DOING philosophy of religion, and I believe that EVERYONE should do some philosophy of religion sometime in their life (at least everyone who is not completely occupied with the struggle to survive, to obtain food, clothing, shelter, and healthcare). Dawkins’ book is helping to make this IDEAL become a reality.

P2. Although Dawkins is NOT a philosopher, he has managed to produce an interesting argument against the existence of God that is worthy of serious consideration by anyone who is interested in the question “Does God exist?”, including serious consideration by philosophers.

P3. I greatly appreciate and fully embrace Dawkins’ idea of levels of belief and disbelief. This idea is a great way to help people escape from dogmatism and closedmindedness, and there IS dogmatism and closedmindedness both among believers in God and among doubters and atheists. The idea of levels of belief and disbelief promotes two important insights related to the question “Does God exist?”. First, it encourages people to think about this issue in terms of PROBABILITY. Second, it points to the fact that there are a variety of points of view on this question, not just the extremes of dogmatic atheism and dogmatic theism.

THREE NEGATIVE POINTS

N1. In The God Delusion, Dawkins FAILS to make and maintain a clear distinction between three different and distinct skeptical points of view, and so he sometimes contradicts himself because of the UNCLARITY of his thinking:
⦁ weak-sense atheism: the rejection of the belief that God exists.
⦁ strong-sense atheism: the rejection of the belief that some sort of god exists.
⦁ naturalism: the belief that everything that exists is natural and that nothing that exists is supernatural (there are no persons, beings, creatures, objects, powers, or forces that are supernatural).

N2. In The God Delusion, Dawkins proposes a definition of “God” that is seriously flawed because it is TOO BROAD (it includes supernatural creators who are not omnipotent, or not omniscient, or not perfectly morally good, or not bodiless). These serious flaws in his definition violate the criteria for a good definition that Dawkins himself puts forward on page 13 of The God Delusion.

N3. In The God Delusion Dawkins does a poor job of dealing with arguments for God by the well-known Christian philosopher Thomas Aquinas. Dawkins presents a very INACCURATE and UNFAIR characterization of Aquinas’s case for the existence of God, thus committing the STRAW MAN fallacy against Aquinas. Furthermore, Dawkins does so NOT in order to intentionally deceive people, but does this unintentionally because Dawkins is IGNORANT about Aquinas’ actual case for the existence of God (suggesting that Dawkins did not bother to actually READ the case for God by Aquinas).