bookmark_borderYahweh vs. Thor

On my Twitter timeline, I saw the following:

“Atheism does not require certainty. But we can be as certain the Christian god does not exist as Christians are that Thor does not exist.”

If I were to reword the tweet, albeit in a way that is too long for twitter, I would have offered something like this:

“Atheism, when defined as the belief that God does not exist, does not require certainty. Rather, like any other belief, people can hold this belief with varyingdegrees of belief. The atheist’s degree of belief that the Christian god does not exist is the same or virtually the same as the atheist’s degree of belief that Thor does not exist.”

Okay, I said it was wordy.

What to make of this proposed rewording? Three thoughts.
1. On the assumption that atheism is true, it doesn’t follow that Thor and the Christian god have the same (im)probability. It’s easier to illustrate this point using metaphysical naturalism, which entails that no supernatural beings exist. Let’s say the naturalist’s degree of belief that naturalism is true is 0.95. It follows, then, that the maximum degree of belief a naturalist could assign to any supernatural being, including Thor and the Christian god, is 0.05. (This is because both Thor and the Christian god entail that supernaturalism is true; thus neither Thor nor Yahweh can be more probable than supernaturalism.) But it doesn’t follow that the naturalist’s degree of belief in the existence of Thor or the Christian god would actually be 0.05; it could be (and probably is) less than that amount. Why? Because Thor and the Christian god make many more specific claims than ‘mere’ supernaturalism.
2. If one adopts Draper’s theory of intrinsic probability–which says that a proposition’s intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else–then the naturalist (who, by definition, is an atheist) would probably say that the intrinsic probability of Thor and Yahweh are roughly equal if not exactly equal. (I have to confess I haven’t studied Norse mythology, so I don’t know if that would be correct or not. It wouldn’t surprise me in the least if it were true, however.)
3. Turning to the final probability of Thor and Yahweh, final probability is determined by intrinsic probability and the likelihood of the evidence. In order to defend the claim that Thor and Yahweh have the same final probabilities, one would need to evaluate the evidence for both. I don’t have much to say about this other than one point: atheists can believe that both Yahweh and Thor have low, even ridiculously low, final probabilities without believing they are equal.
For example, it’s possible that a naturalist who has studied both Norse mythology and Christian apologetics might reach the following conclusions:
(a) Both Thor and Yahweh have very low (but not hopelessly low) intrinsic probabilities.
(b) The likelihood of the evidence relevant to Thor is 0.01.
(c) The likelihood of the evidence relevant to Yahweh is 0.04.
(d) Therefore, while the evidence for Yahweh is four times as strong as the evidence for Thor, the evidence for both is pathetically weak and hence both have extremely low final probabilities.
Given the low intrinsic probabilities of both Thor and Yahweh, however, the naturalist might justifiably believe an investigation of the Thor-specific and Yahweh-specific evidence isn’t worth his or her time. This might especially be the case if the naturalist believes he or she has strong evidence against mere supernaturalism.
This point leads to another rewording of the tweet.

“Atheism does not require certainty. But highly specific supernatural claims, like “Thor exists” and “Yahweh exists,” are so intrinsically improbable that an investigation of the evidence isn’t worth the effort.”

bookmark_borderJ.L. Schellenberg on the Philosophy of Religion

While searching on J.L. Schellenberg, I stumbled across the following comment in a combox for a post about calls to end the philosophy of religion as a discipline (skip down to comment #47). I think it’s worth quoting in full.

Having done philosophy of religion as an atheist for more than twenty years, I find the idea that atheistic belief should lead one to view philosophy of religion as useless or pernicious a bit out of touch with reality. Theistic work in philosophy of religion is, for cultural reasons, getting the lion’s share of attention. But this should not prevent us from noticing that the field is in fact rather well populated by non-theists. Rather, it gives us a reason to try to bring them – people like Paul Draper, Evan Fales, Steve Maitzen, Graham Oppy, Robin LePoidevin, William Rowe, and plenty of others — a lot more visibility. Those who call for an end to philosophy of religion might get some insight into just what they’re talking about (and then productively fall silent) if they consulted the work of people like these to discover why even an atheist might spend a lifetime doing philosophy of religion.

The answer is not that an atheist might spend a lifetime crawling through the minutiae of non-Christian or non-theistic religious belief systems. Here it is helpful to have formed some general conception of what philosophy of religion is about. Philosophy of religion, as I see it, involves bringing to bear on both actual and possible religious ideas and practices the resources of the rest of philosophy (ethics, epistemology, etc.) and, reciprocally, bringing to bear on the rest of philosophy the best results from philosophy of religion. If anyone thinks that the work of Christian philosophers exhausts either of these dimensions of the field, or that the most important such work has been completed if/when we recognize that there is no personal deity, they are sadly mistaken. Even if theism is false, other religious ideas – including the most fundamental (which should therefore be of greater interest to philosophers) – remain to be explored. Many of these ideas and explorations will not bring us into the embrace of some living religious tradition, but rather call for us to stretch our imaginations beyond the results of a few millenia of activity on the part of religious people.

Atheism, as I see it, therefore marks not the end of philosophy of religion but is something more like its beginning. Of course, if one is suffering from such common afflictions as the assumption that there are no real intellectual options in this realm other than traditional theism and metaphysical naturalism, or the virus that subtly turns one’s mind from a love of truth to an activist orientation, then one cannot be expected to make much sense of this. But philosophy is supposed to deliver us from such afflictions.

bookmark_borderThe Logic of the Resurrection – Part 6

In Part 4 of this series, we saw that Theodore Drange interpreted Christian theologian Charles Hodge to be arguing as follows (“Why Resurrect Jesus?” in The Empty Tomb, p. 56) :

(2a) (JRD) is a sufficient condition for (JSG).


(1a) (JRD) is necessary condition for (JSG).



(JRD) Jesus rose from the dead.

(JSG) Jesus is the divine Son of God.


In terms of symbolic logic, the argument is this:

(2b) (JRD)  implies  (JSG).


(1b)  (JSG)  implies  (JRD).

I argued for an alternative interpretation, but let’s stick with Drange’s interpretation for now and see where he leads us.
As mentioned previously, Drange points out that (1a) does not follow logically from (2a).  The inference is invalid.
Drange also objects to the truth of premise (2a):
 But, in fact, it [the claim that Jesus “rose from the dead”] does not entail any of them [any of nine different theological claims about Jesus, including that Jesus is “the Son of God”]. …His resurrection might have been produced by voodoo magic.  Or it might have been produced naturalistically, say through the work of highly advanced extraterrestrials. (TET, p.56-57)
Basically, the resurrection is thought to have theological significance, but that is true only on the ASSUMPTION that God performed the resurrection of Jesus.  As Drange notes, if some other being or power caused Jesus to rise from the dead, then the resurrection of Jesus does not have the theological significance that Hodge,  and Christian believers in general, attach to that (alleged) event.  Thus, (JRD) is not sufficient, by itself, to logically imply or prove (JSG).  Additional assumptions are required.
Then Drange considers the truth of Hodge’s conclusion (1a), and he rejects this conclusion:
The Resurrection was in no way necessary for that [for Jesus to be “the Son of God”].  Christ could still have been and could still be the Son of God even if his earthly body had been destroyed.   It is the spirit and/or soul that is supposed to live on. …it is his spirit and/or soul that could play the divine role of “Son”, just as it was presumably his spirit and/or soul that lived and was the Son of God prior to his advent on earth. (TET, p.58)
Since Jesus was the Son of God prior to having a physical body, it is clearly possible for Jesus to continue to be the Son of God without having a physical body after his death.
Drange makes other arguments showing that the Resurrection of Jesus is also not necessary for the truth of various other theological claims about Jesus.
Drange is correct on both counts.  (JRD) is NOT a sufficient condition for (JSG), and (JRD) is NOT a necessary condition for (JSG).  So, if Hodge or any other Christian believes that the resurrection of Jesus is the most important fact of history because they think that (JRD) is a sufficient condition of (JSG) or because they think that (JRD) is a necessary condition of (JSG), then they are sadly mistaken.  There is no such simple and direct logical relationship between the resurrection of Jesus and various theological claims about Jesus, such as that “Jesus is the divine Son of God.”
However, there may be some sort of logical relationship between these claims, a logical relationship that is less simple or less direct.
For example, (JRD) might be a premise of a key argument in support of (JSG).  If so, then even though there is no simple and direct logical relationship between these two claims, (JRD) could be an important fact, because of a role it plays in an apologetic argument for (JSG), an argument that might go like this (see Part 3):

(JRD) Jesus rose from the dead.

(RAW) Jesus performed the right actions and spoke the right words making him a person with characteristics C1, C2, etc.

(GLR) God would be likely to raise someone from the dead who had characteristics C1, C2, etc. 

Therefore (probably):

(GRJ) God raised Jesus from the dead.

(JCD)  Jesus claimed to be the divine Son of God.
(GUR) If Jesus claimed to be the divine Son of God, and Jesus was NOT the Son of God, then it would be very unlikely that God would raise Jesus from the dead.
Therefore (probably):

(JSG) Jesus is the divine Son of God.

Obviously, other assumptions have been added to (JRD) in order to be able to arrive at the desired conclusion.  Thus, even if this apologetic argument was a good argument, there would not be a simple and direct logical relationship between (JRD) and (JSG), but there would be a somewhat complex and indirect logical relationship between these claims.

It should be noted that there are OTHER apologetic arguments that are sometimes given in support of (JSG).  There are at least three main arguments that I’m aware of:

  • The Resurrection Apologetic Argument
  • The Fulfilled Prophecy Apologetic Argument
  • The Trilemma Apologetic Argument (Lord, Liar, or Lunatic)

Thus, if the Resurrection argument failed, there would still be at least two other arguments that could be used to defend the theological claim (JSG).  This somewhat diminishes the importance of the resurrection of Jesus, since even in terms of apologetics, it is not absolutely necessary.  Other arguments are available for the same conclusion.  However, to the extent that these are the three main apologetic arguments for (JSG), the resurrection does play a significant role in Christian apologetics.

Furthermore, although Drange is correct that (JRD) is NOT a necessary condition for (JSG), the negation of (JRD) can serve as a premise in a powerful argument against (JSG), and this is another important, though not entirely simple and direct, logical relationship between the claims (JRD) and (JSG).

Here is the anti-Christian argument I have in mind:

(3) It is NOT the case that (JRD).

(4) It is the case that (JPR) [Jesus predicted that he would rise from the dead].

(5) If  (JPR) is the case and  it is NOT the case that (JRD), then it is the case that (JFP) [Jesus was a false prophet].

(6) If (JFP) is the case, then it is NOT the case that (JSG).


(7)  It is NOT the case that (JSG).

So, if it turns out that Jesus did not rise from the dead, then there would be a very powerful argument AGAINST the claim that Jesus was the divine Son of God.  So, the resurrection of Jesus also has this negative importance.  If (JRD) is shown to be false, then that would create the potential for a powerful argument against the Christian religion.


Anti-Christian Argument based on the Negation of the Resurrection

(3a)  ~ (JRD).

(4a)  (JPR).

(5a)  (JPR) & ~ (JRD)  implies  (JFP).

(6a) (JFP)  implies ~ (JSG).


(7a) ~ (JSG).

bookmark_borderLuke Muelhauser: The Courtier’s Reply, the Not My Theology Reply, and Straw Men

The Courtier’s Reply is useless. It ignores the real target of an argument.

The Not My Theology Reply is legitimate, though it may be beyond the scope of the present discussion. If someone’s argument does not apply to your philosophy but it does apply to the philosophy of others, then that argument probably wasn’t intended for you. But you might still want to make the Not My Theology reply just to clear things up for people.

The Straw Man Reply is legitimate only if someone misrepresents the view he intends to attack. Remember that many arguments are not intended to attack every variety of your worldview there is.


bookmark_borderMichael Martin Has Died

I just learned the horrible news that renowned philosopher Michael Martin (1932-2015) died unexpectedly yesterday. He will be missed.
I hope to write a proper tribute to him at a later time. For now, I want to provide links to his books. (For links to his online essays on The Secular Web, click on his name above.)
Atheism: A Philosophical Justification
The Case Against Christianity
Atheism, Morality, and Meaning
The Cambridge Companion to Atheism
The Impossibility of God (with Ricki Monier)
The Improbability of God (with Ricki Monier)
The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case Against Life After Death (with Keith Augustine)

bookmark_borderWhat is Faith? – Part 9

Here are some key points from the first section (Relation of Faith to Reason) of Geisler’s article “Faith and Reason” (Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, p. 239; hereafter: BECA):

  • The contents of faith “are above reason.” and so must be revealed to humans by God.
  • Faith “involves will (freedom) and reason doesn’t coerce the will”.
  • Some theological truths “have been proved demonstratively” and can be based on reason, such as the existence of God.

If we take the second point in a straightforward manner, then there appears to be no conflict between faith and reason, at least in terms of the requirement that the assent of faith be a free choice.  If reason doesn’t compel a person to give assent to any theological claim or doctrine (or against any such claim or doctrine), then reason doesn’t preclude a person from freely choosing to give assent to any theological claim or doctrine.
The question I’m not clear how to answer is this:  Can a demonstrative proof compel a person to assent to the conclusion of the proof?  always? sometimes? never?  What is Aquinas’ view on this question?  I’m not sure.
The second section of the article is about Three Uses of Reason:  1. Reason can be used to prove the “preambles of faith”, such as the existence of God.  2. Reason can be used to explain or clarify a theological concept or doctrine.  3. Reason can be used to defend a theological belief by refuting an objection or an argument against that belief. (BECA, p.239).
Although the “preambles of faith” can be “proved demonstratively”(Summa Theologica, 1a.3.2), “such arguments are not available for the second kind of divine truth…” (Gentiles, 1.9, quoted in BECA, p.239).  An example of the second kind of divine truth would be the doctrine of the Trinity.  Aquinas believed that reason alone was insufficient to discover or to prove the doctrine of the Trinity, and that humans can possess this truth only because God has revealed this to us.
The passage quoted from Gentiles 1.9 also includes the following comments about divine revelation:
The sole way to overcome an adversary of divine truth is from the authority of Scripture–an authority divinely confirmed by miracles.  For that which is above the human reason we believe only because God has revealed it.  Nevertheless, there are certainly likely [probable] arguments that should be brought forth in order to make divine truth known.
Apparently when Aquinas speaks of “divine truth” here, he is speaking of the second kind of divine truth (e.g. the doctrine of the Trinity) and not the first kind of divine truth (e.g.  the existence of God), for the first kind of divine truth can be “proved demonstratively” and based on reason alone.
When Aquinas speaks of using “likely [probable] arguments” to support the second kind of divine truth I think he means showing the divine authority of the scriptures (or of Jesus or of the apostles) by making an appeal to the occurence of miracles that allegedly confirm the messages or teachings from those sources.  The authority of the scriptures or revelation is also supported by the belief that God is completely truthful:
…it was necessary for divine truth to be delivered by way of faith, being told to them as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie…(Summa Theologica, 2a2ae.1, 5.4).
So, Aquinas suggests the basic apologetic argument for the authority of scripture:  Miracles confirm that a book or a messenger are bringing a message that truly comes from God, and God is completely truthful, so we can have complete confidence in the truth and accuracy of books or messengers that have been confirmed by miracles.
Apparently, Aquinas does not see this as a demonstrative proof, but rather as a “likely [probable]” argument. Nevertheless, it is still an argument, a bit of reasoning.  Thus, it seems to me that even the second kind of “divine truth”, such as the doctine of the Trinity, ultimately rests on reason, in that it rests on an argument, a bit of reasoning, about the alleged divine inspiration of the scriptures.  The appeal to confirming miracles requires empirical evidence and the evaluation of that evidence, and the important premise that God is completely truthful, is, presumably, based on a “demonstrative” proof about God being a perfectly good person.

bookmark_borderThe Logic of the Resurrection – Index

The Logic of the Resurrection – Part 1
Different assumptions about the existence of God have different implications concerning the resurrection.
The Logic of the Resurrection – Part 2
As Richard Swinburne has pointed out, a complete case for the resurrection must be a three-legged stool, resting upon general background evidence, prior historical evidence, and posterior historical evidence.
The Logic of the Resurrection – Part 3
The logic of the resurrection apologetic is summarized in an argument diagram.
The Logic of the Resurrection – Part 4
In “Why Resurrect Jesus?” Theodore Drange is looking in the right direction, asking the right questions, and taking the right approach to the resurrection of Jesus.
The Logic of the Resurrection – Part 5
In order to make a rational case for the resurrection of Jesus, one must establish God’s primary purpose(s) or motive(s) concerning humans.
The Logic of the Resurrection – Part 6
Drange shows that the resurrection of Jesus is neither a necessary condition nor a sufficient condition for the claim that Jesus is the divine Son of God.  I suggest that (JRD) is logically related to (JSG) as a premise of a key argument for (JSG).
The Logic of the Resurrection – Part 7
There is no reasonable or plausible way for Christian apologists to provide solid evidence about the motivations and purposes of God concerning human beings.  If I am correct about this, then there is no way for Christian apologists to show that “God raised Jesus from the dead.”
A Related Series of Posts about the Prior Historical Evidence part of the case for (GRJ):
Jesus: True Prophet or False Prophet? – Part 1
Jesus: True Prophet or False Prophet? – Part 2
Jesus: True Prophet or False Prophet? – Part 3

bookmark_borderThe Logic of the Resurrection – Part 5

Before I continue to examine Theodore Drange’s excellent article “Why Resurrect Jesus?” (The Empty Tomb, p. 55-67), I want to reinforce a key point: an important but neglected aspect of the case for the resurrection of Jesus is what Swinburne calls General Background Evidence, specifically reasons and evidence related to God’s alleged purposes.
I would ammend the title of Drange’s article slightly to: “Why would God Resurrect Someone?”  Unless and until a plausible and defensible argument can be made for some specific purpose(s) or motivation(s) that would make it likely for God to raise someone from the dead, the case for the resurrection of Jesus remains incomplete and unsuccessful.
For the resurrection apologetic to work, it must show that God raised Jesus (GRJ), for if Jesus was raised by the devil, or by a Voodoo priest, or by a magical potion from a witch, or by a space alien, or by a Greek god (e.g. Zeus or Poseidon or Ares), then Jesus’ return from the dead would not have theological significance, would not show that Jesus was the divine Son of God, the savior of humankind.
Contrary to the assumption of many believers, we do not know that God is the only being capable of raising Jesus from the dead.  For all we know, there are millions of angels, demons, and demi-gods who have the power to raise the dead.  So, even if it could be shown that Jesus rose from the dead, it does NOT follow that God raised Jesus.
How can it be shown that God did this as opposed to some other person or being?   We can think about this question more clearly and rationally by thinking about a similar question that is often given very serious rational thought:
How can it be shown that some particular person murdered some other person?
Let’s say that a person was killed with a gun.  Shot in the chest, neck, and stomach with several bullets from a handgun.  If we can locate the weapon, we can trace the ownership and possession of the weapon to see who the most recent owner is, and the most recent known location/storage of the weapon prior to it’s use to kill the victim.
We can also check the gun for fingerprints, to identify who has held the gun in their hands.  We can also check for fingerprints. hairs, DNA, and footprints or shoe prints and tire tracks at the scene of the crime, to help identify the people who have been at that location recently, perhaps at the time of the murder.
We can search for witnesses to the murder and interview them.  If someone claims to have seen the murder, or to have been in the general  area at the time of the murder, that person might have seen or heard the murderer arrive or leave the location of the crime or seen or heard the vehicle of the murderer arrive or leave the location.
We can interview friends and family and co-workers of the victim to try to identify suspects, particularly someone who either had a motivation to kill the victim or someone who knew the victim and who had a known proclivity or tendency towards violence.
If suspects are identified, then we could look even closer for possible motivations for killing the victim, and also look more closely at the question of means and opportunity.   Did the suspect have access to the gun used in the killing (or to a gun, if the gun used was not yet located)?  Was the suspect in the area of the crime scene around the time the murder took place?
These are the sorts of considerations that a homicide detective must investigate and use to identify suspects, to eliminate suspects, and to determine whether there is enough evidence to focus in on one or two primary suspects as the likely perpetrator(s).
But when we ask the question “Did God do such-and-such?”  most of the above considerations are of no use.  God does not need to use tools.  If God wants someone to die, then God only has to will them to die, and that person would instantly die.  God does not need a gun or a knife to kill someone.  Furthermore, if God did for some odd reason decide to use a gun to kill someone, God has no fingers, so God would not leave any fingerprints, nor any footprints, nor any hairs or blood or DNA.  God has no body, so God leaves no physical traces of himself behind, the way that humans do.  Also, if God chose to use a gun to kill someone, God, being omnipotent, could make the gun vanish into nothingness as soon as the victim was killed.
Furthermore, if God were a supsect in a murder, it would make no sense to ask whether God was in the area at the time the murder took place.  God is omnipresent, so God is always present at all locations and all times past, present, and future.  God is always present everywhere.  So God’s “location” is of no help in either identifying God as the culprit or in eliminating God as a suspect.
Witnesses are not of much help either, because God is an invisible bodiless person.  People would never see God perform the killing, because God does not have a body and thus God cannot be seen or heard or touched or smelled.
In short, there is very little for a detective to go on in order to make a case for God being the murderer of a particular person on a particular occasion (or to eliminate God as a suspect).  The only consideration that a detective uses to determine a primary suspect in a murder investigation that appears to have application to God is: MOTIVE.
If we know some of God’s main purposes and motivations, especially concerning human beings, then that could be relevant EVIDENCE to help determine whether God is a likely suspect or candidate for having done something to someone, including determing whether God is a likely suspect or candidate for having raised Jesus from the dead.
If we do not know what God’s main purposes or motivations are relative to human beings, then I do not see how it would be possible to IDENTIFY God as a likely suspect for being the person who caused Jesus to come back from the dead.  Thus, God’s purposes and motivations concering human beings are an essential element of any plausible rational case for the resurrection of Jesus, for the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead.
Although we do know that God is a perfectly morally good person, because that is part of the meaning of the statement “God exists”, this is not all that helpful.  This is too general and vague to be of much use in determining God’s primary purposes and motivations regarding human beings.  Thus, I am very skeptical about the possiblity of constructing a plausible and defensible explanation for why God would be likely to raise someone from the dead.

bookmark_borderAnother Terrible Atheist Debate Performance

I originally planned to blog my thoughts about this oral debate while I was watching it. Then after I had a rather nasty exchange on Twitter with the atheist debater, I said I wasn’t going to write about him anytime soon. Then I thought about it some more. I realized the only reason I was going to engage in self-censorship was to avoid all of the drama associated with criticizing anything to do with this individual’s arguments, blog posts, books, or debates. “That’s a really bad reason to say silent,” I thought to myself.
About 20 years ago, the atheist community had another self-proclaimed atheist debater who delivered consistently incompetent performances in all or virtually all of his debates: Gordon Stein. At that time, it was something of a ‘trade secret’ among people in the atheist movement that Stein was just awful as a debater. It was a secret, not public knowledge, because no one had the courage to stand up to him and publicly point out the obvious. I’m not sure why that was the case, but I think it may have had something to do with his very senior role at the Council for Secular Humanism, now known as the Center for Inquiry.
The most famous of his very public failures was his ill-fated debate with Christian presuppositionalist philosopher Greg Bahnsen. Bahnsen exposed Stein’s incompetence in philosophy so decisively that recordings of this debate have been extremely popular in Christian circles (or at least presuppositionalist circles). For the record, I have no objection whatsoever to the facts that (a) Bahnsen debated Stein; (b) recordings of the debate were (and are) being sold;  and (c) Christians proclaim Bahnsen as the winner. But once we reflect on the fact that Stein was philosophically incompetent, it becomes clear that Bahnsen’s debate victory is of very little–if any–philosophical significance.
Fast forward to today. Unlike Stein, the debater I am referring to IS philosophically competent. In fact, he has multiple graduate degrees relevant to the topics he debates. Furthermore, he is the author or editor of numerous books on atheism, Christianity, and science. His problem is not a lack of training or knowledge. Rather, his problem is a complete lack of skill at oral debate. This should become obvious, I think, after watching just his opening statement. His opening statement was so bizarre and ineffective–so bad–I couldn’t even finish watching it.
After the atheist debater reads this blog post, I won’t be surprised at all if he throws a temper tantrum and attempts to defame me on his blog or social media. I predict he will think I wrote this blog post because “I don’t like him” or “I’ve never said anything good about him.” If he does think that, he’s wrong. So why am I writing this? Simple. In case anyone watches the video of this debate and says, “Wow, if THAT is the best the atheists have to offer, then their debaters suck!” at least one atheist will have gone on record publicly as stating that this debate performance is one of the worst atheist debate performances; his performance is NOT representative of the best atheists have to offer.
I predict that any other objective person who watches this debate will agree with that assessment.