Aquinas

Feser’s Case for God – Part 3: Actualization of Potential

FESER TAKES OWNERSHIP OF THE FIVE ARGUMENTS In Five Proofs of the Existence of God (hereafter: FPEG), Edward Feser presents five “proofs” or arguments, each of which was inspired by an historical philosopher (or two).  However,  Feser takes full ownership of these five arguments, so that none of these arguments is put forward as merely Feser’s Case for God – Part 3: Actualization of Potential

I Don’t Care – Part 3

According to the Christian philosopher Peter Kreeft, and many others, Aquinas gives five different arguments for the existence of God.  In the Handbook of Christian Apologetics (IVP, 1994; hereafter: HCA) by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, there is a chapter that lays out twenty different arguments for the existence of God, and the first five arguments I Don’t Care – Part 3

I Don’t Care – Part 2

OK. Maybe I care just a little bit. I summarized my complaint against Aquinas’ Five Ways this way (in response to a comment from Jeff Lowder): I’m just pointing out that (a) NONE of the Five Ways is an argument for the existence of God as it stands (in the section called “Whether God Exists?”), I Don’t Care – Part 2

What is Faith? – Part 9

Here are some key points from the first section (Relation of Faith to Reason) of Geisler’s article “Faith and Reason” (Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, p. 239; hereafter: BECA): If we take the second point in a straightforward manner, then there appears to be no conflict between faith and reason, at least in terms of the What is Faith? – Part 9

What is Faith? – Part 8

In the Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (1999; hereafter: BECA), Geisler has written a fairly long and detailed article on “Faith and Reason”, and the entire article is basically an exposition of the views of Aquinas about faith and the relationship between faith and reason. There are nine bolded subheadings in Geisler’s article on “Faith What is Faith? – Part 8

What is Faith – Part 6

I have noticed a problem of unclarity in my own thinking and writing about the Thomist view of faith.  Before I go further in discussing Swinburne’s characterization of the Thomist view of faith, I want to briefly consider the point of unclarity or ambiguity in my previous discussion of this view of faith. I have What is Faith – Part 6

What is Faith? – Part 5

We have been examining the Thomist view of faith, as characterized by Richard Swinburne in Faith and Reason (FAR). In order to avoid the implication that one must reason in a circle in order to have ‘faith in God’, a supporter of the Thomist view of faith can draw a distinction between beliefs about God What is Faith? – Part 5

What is Faith? – Part 4

We have looked at a simple and widespread understanding of ‘faith in God’: Definition 1 Person P has faith in God IF AND ONLY IF  P believes that God exists. One problem with Def. 1 is that the devil himself would have ‘faith in God’ based on this definition, and thus this could hardly be considered  to What is Faith? – Part 4

What is Faith? – Part 3

I said that I was not going to walk slowly through the rest of Chapter 4 of Faith and Reason (FAR), by Richard Swinburne.  But there is a lot going on in the next few paragraphs of Chapter 4, and I find myself wanting to make several comments on them.  So, contrary to my previous What is Faith? – Part 3