arguments for theism

Why I Reject the Resurrection – Part 7: Dynamic Probability Objection

THE DYNAMIC PROBABILITY OBJECTION The dynamic probability objection to my reasoning about the resurrection is based on the general logic of Richard Swinburne’s case for the resurrection.  In his book The Existence of God,  Swinburne argues that various inductive arguments for God form a cumulative case that makes the existence of God “more probable than Why I Reject the Resurrection – Part 7: Dynamic Probability Objection

Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 18: Interpretation of Argument #4

In Part 17, I analyzed the logical structure of Peter Kreeft’s Argument #4, the Argument from Degrees of Perfection.  That clarification of the logic of this argument, however, is not sufficient to make it possible to rationally evaluate this argument.  The meanings of each and every premise in Argument #4 are UNCLEAR, making it impossible Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 18: Interpretation of Argument #4