Kreeft’s Case for God – Part #27: The Universe and Time
I am starting to think about the Kalam Cosmological Argument, Argument #6 in Peter Kreeft’s case for God, from Chapter 3 of his Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA). This is the final argument that we need to consider in Kreeft’s case for God.This is not the first time I have examined this argument. When I … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part #27: The Universe and Time
Letter to Peter Kreeft
Dear Dr. Peter Kreeft, I have recently been studying your Argument #7, the Argument from Contingency: http://www.peterkreeft.com/topics-more/20_arguments-gods-existence.htm#7 In the second premise, you provide a definition of “the universe”: 2. The universe—the collection of beings in space and time—exists. Although I appreciate the attempt to clarify the meaning of this phrase, the definition itself seems unclear … Letter to Peter Kreeft
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 26: The Unclarity of Argument #7
WHERE WE ARE AT There are only two more arguments in Kreeft’s case that we need to evaluate: Argument #7 (the Argument from Contingency) and Argument #6 (the Kalam Cosmological Argument). In Part 24, I did an initial analysis of Argument #7, and I pointed out some significant problems with that argument, based only on … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 26: The Unclarity of Argument #7
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 25: Clarification of Argument #7
WHERE WE ARE AT There are only two more arguments in Kreeft’s case that we need to evaluate: Argument #7 (the Argument from Contingency) and Argument #6 (the Kalam Cosmological Argument). In Part 24, I did an initial analysis of Argument #7, and I pointed out some significant problems with that argument, based only on … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 25: Clarification of Argument #7
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 24: The Argument from Contingency
WHERE WE ARE AT There are only two more arguments for the existence of God left to consider out of the twenty arguments in Peter Kreeft’s case for God from Chapter 3 of Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA). In this post I will analyze Argument #7: the Argument from Contingency. THE CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 24: The Argument from Contingency
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 23: Five Remaining Arguments
WHERE WE ARE AT I have previously argued that the last ten arguments in Peter Kreeft’s case in Chapter 3 of his Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA) fail to provide us with a good reason to believe that God exists. I have argued that the first five arguments, which Kreeft appears to think are among … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 23: Five Remaining Arguments
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 22: Kreeft’s Reply
MY BAIT-AND-SWITCH OBJECTION In Part 21 I reiterated a criticism of Kreeft’s case for the existence of God that has been a theme in my critique: very few, if any, of Kreeft’s twenty arguments are actually arguments for the existence of God, thus Chapter 3 of Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA) appears to be … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 22: Kreeft’s Reply
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 21: Bait and Switch?
WHERE WE ARE AT In Part 1 through Part 8, I argued that the last ten of Peter Kreefts twenty arguments for God in Chapter 3 of his book Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA) are all bad arguments and fail to provide us with any good reason to believe that God exists. In Part 9 … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 21: Bait and Switch?
Why I Reject the Resurrection – Part 7: Dynamic Probability Objection
THE DYNAMIC PROBABILITY OBJECTION The dynamic probability objection to my reasoning about the resurrection is based on the general logic of Richard Swinburne’s case for the resurrection. In his book The Existence of God, Swinburne argues that various inductive arguments for God form a cumulative case that makes the existence of God “more probable than … Why I Reject the Resurrection – Part 7: Dynamic Probability Objection
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 20: More on Argument #4
THE INITIAL INFERENCE IN ARGUMENT #4 In Part 19, I argued that the initial inference or sub-argument in Argument #4 (the Argument from Degrees of Perfection) of Peter Kreeft’s case for God is very unclear, and that based on my best guess at what the premises of that sub-argument mean, one premise begs the question … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 20: More on Argument #4