WHERE WE ARE

In my initial post on miracles, I analyzed eight different definitions of the word “miracle” into seven different elements:

IMPACT – the emotional or psychological effect of a miracle

GENUS – the most general category to which a miracle belongs

SPECIES – the sub-category (of the most general category) to which a miracle belongs

AGENT/CAUSE – the person(s) or kind of being(s) or kind of thing(s) that brings about a miracle

EXCEPTION – the way in which a miracle departs from ordinary or normal circumstances

BASELINE – the ordinary or normal circumstances from which a miracle departs

PURPOSE – the goal or intention behind the making of a miracle

In Part 1 of this series of posts, I argued that the element of IMPACT should be eliminated from definitions of “miracle”. I also suggested that the GENUS and SPECIES elements of the definition by Habermas were the best, and that the SPECIES element in the definition by Evans was also very good and should be a requirement added to the SPECIES element from Habermas.

In Part 2, I argued that the AGENT/CAUSE element should be very broad in terms of a definition that captures the ordinary meaning of the word “miracle” (i.e. the very broad requirement in the definition by Habermas), but that in the context of miracles being put forward as evidence for a Christian belief, we should stipulate a much narrower requirement, namely the requirement that God caused the event.

In Part 3, I argued that the BASELINE and EXCEPTION elements should be eliminated from definitions of “miracle” in order to avoid importing controversial or questionable philosophical theories into the definition of this key word. The main alternative philosophical theories being from Aquinas and Hume: miracles involve an exception to the natural order (Aquinas) or miracles involve an exception to the laws of nature (Hume). These alternative theories can still be maintained and used in philosophical discussions about miracles as evidence for Christian beliefs, independently of how the word “miracle” is defined.

In Part 4, I argued that the PURPOSE element should be eliminated from definitions of “miracle” because the PURPOSE requirement is either too broad (and thus redundant) or is too narrow (and thus contradicts the basic requirement that the cause of miracles is God).

REVISED ANALYSIS CHART OF EIGHT DEFINITIONS OF “MIRACLE”

I have shaded the columns in my analysis chart gray that represent the elements that I have argued should be eliminated (namely: IMPACT, EXCEPTION, BASELINE, and PURPOSE). I have shaded in green the specific requirements that I take to be correct (or the best of the various alternatives) for the three remaining elements (namely: GENUS, SPECIES, and CAUSE/AGENT). I have shaded in orange the specific requirements that I found to be incorrect or problematic for the three remaining elements.

A GOOD DEFINITION OF THE WORD “MIRACLE”

GENUS: an event (Habermas)

SPECIES1: which may be perceived by man’s senses (Habermas)

SPECIES2: brought about by… (Evans)

AGENT/CAUSE: God (Purtill, Kreeft & Tacelli, Evans, and Geisler)

I propose a few revisions to the wording used in the above definitions:

X is a miracle IF AND ONLY IF:

(a) X is an event in the physical universe, and

(b) X may be detected by means of observations made by use of ordinary human senses, and

(c) X was intentionally brought about by God.

The ordinary use of the word “miracle” allows for miracles to be caused by a wide variety of agents/beings (and even by impersonal forces), not just by God. However, when the context is a discussion about miracles as evidence for a Christian belief, it makes sense to narrow the definition so that only events brought about by God count as miracles. Only such miracles are relevant to such discussions.

Although this definition does not require that a miracle involve an exception to the natural order, nor does it require that a miracle involve an exception to the laws of nature, it does not preclude a Christian philosopher or apologist from using arguments about events that involve an exception to the natural order or about events that involve an exception to the laws of nature. Philosophers and apologists may still argue that, for example, an event that involves an exception to a law of nature must have been brought about by God, or that such an event is a likely candidate for an event that has been brought about by God.

I qualify “event” as being “in the physical universe” to avoid any “miracle” claims about events in the alleged supernatural realm. The point of miracles as evidence for a Christian belief is that miracles are events in the physical universe that humans can detect with their ordinary senses. An appeal to events in an alleged supernatural realm are non-starters as evidence for Christian beliefs.

God bringing about an event in the physical universe is, of course, something that occurs in the supernatural realm as well as in the physical universe. But the supernatural aspect (God bringing about an event) is INFERRED from the event that takes place in the physical universe. We start with an event in the physical universe that is detected by means of observations by ordinary human senses, and then we attempt to INFER from that information something about the activity of God in the supernatural realm.

I added the phrase “detected by means of” in order to allow for events in the physical universe that are not directly observable. For example, events on the atomic and sub-atomic level are not directly observable. X-rays are not directly observable. The big bang and the evolution of mammals and humans are not directly observable. The coming back to life of Jesus was not directly observed by any human being. But we can use ordinary human senses to make observations, and from those observations we may correctly infer the occurrence of events in the physical universe that are not subject to direct observation.

I added the qualification “intentionally” to “brought about by God” even though that qualification is redundant (God being omniscient cannot cause something to happen by accident or by mistake or unintentionally). This serves to remind us that whenever God (or any other agent) performs an action, there is necessarily an intention or reason or purpose for that action. I eliminated the PURPOSE element from my definition, because God, as a perfectly morally good person, has a multitude of purposes and goals, and thus we cannot limit God to some narrow range of purposes or goals.