Craig’s Case for God – Part 1: Introduction
Dr. William Craig presents a case for the existence of God in his book How Do We Know God Exists? (Lexham Press, Bellingham, WA, 2022; hereafter: HDWK). In this short book of less than 100 pages, Craig presents two cosmological arguments, a moral argument, a teleological argument, and an ontological argument for the existence of God. Craig concludes that all five of these arguments are “good arguments”.
But in this book (HDWK), Craig never claims to KNOW that God exists, and he never claims that these “good arguments” provide sufficient grounds for KNOWING that God exists. In other words, the title of the book is a classic “bait and switch” swindle. The book says NOTHING in support of the view that Craig or anyone else KNOWS that God exists.
Furthermore, it is clear from the very start of the book, that the five arguments will NOT be sufficient to give one KNOWLEDGE that God exists. Craig is clear about the main conclusion of his book:
These [five arguments] are, I believe, good arguments for God’s existence.
HDWK, p.75
In the Introduction, Craig spells out what he means by a “good argument”:
A good argument will be a sound argument whose premises are more plausible than their negations.
HDWK, p.5-6
But I think this definition sets a much higher standard than what Craig intended to set.
Craig defines a “sound argument” in the standard way:
A sound argument must meet two conditions: (1) it is logically valid…, and (2) its premises are true.
HDWK, p.5
The problem here is that we can judge that a premise is “more plausible than” its negation without knowing whether the premise is TRUE. In that case, however, we do not know whether the argument is a “sound argument”. But being a “sound argument” is a necessary condition for an argument to be a “good argument” according to Craig’s definition. Thus, if we judge the premises of an argument to be “more plausible than their negations” we might well NOT know that the premises are TRUE, and thus we would NOT know that the argument is a “good argument”.
This means that even if we agree with Craig that all of the premises of all five arguments are “more plausible than their negations”, we might well NOT know that any of these premises are TRUE, and thus we would NOT know that any of the arguments are “good arguments”. Although Craig says nothing about this problem, he appears to have some level of awareness of it, because his ultimate conclusion is significantly weakened by the qualification that he merely “believes” that the five arguments are good arguments:
These [five arguments] are, I believe, good arguments for God’s existence.
HDWK, p.75 (emphasis added)
Craig does NOT know that these are good arguments, because he does NOT know that all of their premises are TRUE, and thus does NOT know that these five arguments are all SOUND arguments, and thus does NOT know that all five arguments are GOOD arguments. For most of the premises of these arguments, Craig does NOT know that the premises are TRUE, he merely suspects they are true. That, however, means that there is a significant probability that NONE of these five arguments are SOUND arguments, and thus that NONE of them are GOOD arguments. That being the case, it is clear that Craig’s arguments for God fall far short of providing sufficient grounds for Craig, or anyone else, to KNOW that God exists.
In conclusion, even if all five arguments in Craig’s case are logically valid arguments and we accept Craig’s view that all of their premises are more plausible than their negations, we still do NOT know that these arguments are all “good arguments”, because there is still a significant chance that all five arguments could be UNSOUND. Even in the best case scenario, Craig has FAILED to show that these five arguments provide sufficient grounds for him or anyone else to KNOW that God exists.
There is another reason why this book clearly FAILS to provide sufficient grounds for anyone to KNOW that God exists. Craig makes no attempt whatsoever to challenge any arguments AGAINST the existence of God. Therefore, for all we know, there are many good arguments AGAINST the existence of God. If there is just ONE good argument AGAINST the existence of God, then there is ONE sound argument AGAINST the existence of God, and thus God does NOT exist! Remember, a sound argument is a logically valid argument with true premises. It is logically impossible for God to exist if there is a sound argument AGAINST the existence of God.
Even if we consider Craig’s five arguments to provide five good reasons to believe that God exists, there might well be ten arguments that each provides a good reason to believe that God does NOT exist, in which case, obviously, we would not be in a position to KNOW that God exists. Ten good reasons to believe God does NOT exist might well outweigh five good reasons to believe that God does exist. And just a few good reasons to believe that God does NOT exist might well be enough to counterbalance five good reasons to believe that God exists.
Craig has FAILED to show that there are no sound arguments AGAINST the existence of God, and he has FAILED to show that there are no valid arguments AGAINST the existence of God which have premises that are more plausible than their negations. Craig has also FAILED to show that there are no good reasons to believe that God does NOT exist. This is a second reason why this book by Craig clearly FAILS to provide sufficient grounds for KNOWING that God exists: he makes no effort whatsoever to consider any reasons or arguments AGAINST the existence of God.
NOTE: Craig’s presentation of the five arguments for God is fairly brief in How Do We Know God Exists? He goes into more detail about these arguments in Reasonable Faith (Crossway, 2008, 3rd edition) and in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (InterVarsity Press, 2003, co-authored with J.P. Moreland). So, when I raise an objection against one of his five arguments, I will also consult these other books, to see if he says anything in those books that could be considered a response to my objection.