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Although Spinoza’s primary objection against miracles fails (see my post “Craig vs. Spinoza: A Big Problem for Belief in Miracles“), Spinoza’s second objection against miracles appears to be a powerful and devastating objection against belief in miracles. Spinoza points out that humans cannot distinguish between true miracles (that are brought about by God) and fake miracles (that are brought about by some other supernatural being, such as an angel or a demon).

In the 3rd edition of his book Reasonable Faith (hereafter: RF3), the Christian philosopher William Craig raises three objections against Spinoza’s second objection. So far, I have shown that two of those objections fail:

• Craig’s First Objection Fails (see my post “Craig vs. Spinoza: Craig’s Objections to Spinoza’s Second Objection against Miracles“)
• Craig’s Second Objection Fails (see my post “Craig vs. Spinoza: Craig’s Doctrinal-Context Objection“)

CRAIG’S THIRD OBJECTION

Here is Craig’s third objection to Spinoza’s second objection against miracles:

Spinoza’s concern with lesser spiritual beings like angels and demons would probably not trouble many contemporary minds. Such beings are part of the furniture, so to speak, of a wider theistic worldview, so that no atheist today would seriously concede the Gospel miracles and yet maintain they were performed by angels. It would not seem unwarranted to infer that if such events are genuine miracles, then they were wrought by God.

(RF3, p.266)

According to Craig, atheists don’t believe in angels or demons, so if someone can prove to an atheist that an event in the physical universe was brought about by a supernatural being or force, then that would be sufficient evidence to persuade an atheist that the event in question was brought about by God, and thus was a true miracle.

PROBLEM #1: SOME ATHEISTS BELIEVE IN ANGELS AND DEMONS

First, Craig fails to understand the meaning of the word “atheist”. An atheist is a person who rejects theism.

However, the term “theism” is ambiguous, so there are two kinds of atheism, because there are two kinds of theism. The first kind of theism is belief in some sort of a god or gods. The second kind of theism is belief in a very specific sort of god, namely an eternally perfectly good, eternally all-knowing, eternally all-powerful, eternally immaterial person who is the creator of this universe.

Thus, one sort of atheism rejects the first kind of theism and thus rejects belief in any sort of god or gods. Let’s call this strong-sense atheism. The second sort of atheism rejects the second kind of theism and thus rejects the belief that there exists an eternally perfectly good, eternally all-knowing, eternally all-powerful, eternally immaterial person who is the creator of this universe. Let’s call this weak-sense atheism.

Based on the above clear understanding of the term “atheist”, an atheist CAN believe in angels, and in life after death, and an atheist can, in one sense of the term, believe in a god or gods. Specifically, a person who adopts weak-sense atheism needs only to reject belief in an eternally perfectly good, eternally all-knowing, eternally all-powerful, eternally immaterial person who is the creator of this universe. Such an atheist could believe in angels, demons, life after death, and even in finite gods.

Furthermore, a person who adopts strong-sense atheism needs only to reject belief in any sort of god or gods. Such a person could believe in life after death (unless being immortal implies that one is a god) but not in any finite gods. Since most Christians believe that humans possess immortal souls, and most Christians do not view humans as being gods, it appears that a person can believe in life after death and immortal souls without believing in any sort of god or gods.

Belief in angels and demons might be ruled out by strong-sense atheism, if one considers any such immaterial person/agent to be a god. But Christians believe in angels and yet they claim to NOT believe in finite gods. If a Christian can believe in angels without believing in finite gods, then so can a strong-sense atheist.

Strong-sense atheism also seems to be logically compatible with belief in supernatural powers. If a being counts as a god only if it has at least one superhuman power, then this would mean that if some humans have supernatural powers (e.g. the power of levitation), then such a supernatural power would NOT constitute a superhuman power, and thus would not make a person with that power (e.g. the power of levitation) into a god.

Therefore, a strong-sense atheist who rejects belief in any sort of a god can still believe that, for example, a human being could cause a physical object (such as a large boulder) to levitate several feet off the ground. Such an atheist would reasonably be skeptical about the levitation of a boulder several feet off the ground being considered an event that was caused by God.

Such an atheist would be likely to point out that this event can best be explained as having been brought about by a human being with the supernatural power of levitation, and thus the event would not be a true miracle because it was probably NOT brought about by God. This is the same sort of problem that Spinoza raised in terms of angels or demons causing events in the physical world, and such events being indistinguishable from God causing events in the physical world.

Based upon the above clarification of the meaning of the term “atheist”, Craig is simply wrong in assuming that no atheists believe in angels or demons or in humans who possess supernatural powers. Craig has confused the idea of “atheism” with the metaphysical theory called naturalism. A person who accepts naturalism believes that every thing, every being, every power, and every force that exists is natural, and that there are no supernatural things, or supernatural beings, or supernatural powers, or supernatural forces. Naturalists do not believe in angels, demons, gods, or God. Naturalists do not believe in immortal souls.

While it might well be true that MOST atheists are also naturalists, it is certainly false that ALL atheists are naturalists. So, although MOST atheists do not believe in ghosts, angels, demons, souls, or gods, SOME atheists do believe in ghosts, some believe in angels, some believe in demons, and some believe in immortal souls. Some weak-sense atheists believe in gods; they just don’t believe in the God of the Western religions (an eternally perfectly good, eternally all-knowing, eternally all-powerful, eternally immaterial person who is the creator of this universe).

PROBLEM #2: NOT ALL SKEPTICS ARE ATHEISTS

Craig’s third objection fails not only because he confuses atheism with naturalism, but also because he confuses atheism with skepticism. Craig forgets that skepticism about miracles is not limited just to atheists. Craig forgets about deists, agnostics, new-age believers, Buddhists, polytheists, and animists.

Deists believe that God exists, but that God does not intervene in the physical events in this universe, at least not after initially creating this universe. Deists believe in God but believe that miracles do not ever happen. For deists, no alleged miracle is a true miracle because God never brings about events in the physical universe (except for when God first created the physical universe).

I suspect that most deists, like most atheists, do not believe that angels and demons exist. However, the concept of deism, like the concept of atheism, does NOT rule out or preclude belief in angels, demons, immortal souls, ghosts, or finite gods. So, Spinoza’s second objection against miracles would make sense to any deist who believes in angels, or demons, or finite gods, or in humans who possess supernatural powers.

Agnostics believe that we humans do not (or cannot) know that God exists. Since God must exist in order for true miracles to occur, agnostics are skeptical about miracles. Some agnostics are skeptical about the existence of God because they think that there is some evidence for the existence of God and some evidence against the existence of God, but that the available evidence does not clearly or strongly favor either the existence or the non-existence of God. They think the evidence is ambiguous. Such an agnostic might well NOT reject theism, because he/she believes there is a significant chance that theism is true. Such an agnostic would NOT be an atheist, since atheists reject theism.

However, if someone believes that the available evidence on the question of God’s existence is ambiguous, such an agnostic might also believe that there is strong evidence for the existence of angels, or of demons, or of immortal souls, or of finte gods. Thus, some agnostics might well believe in angels, or demons, or finite gods. Some agnostics might well believe that some humans possess supernatural powers (such as the power of levitation). Therefore, Spinoza’s second objection against miracles would make sense to some agnostics who are not atheists.

New-Age believers commonly believe in angels, demons, spirits and finite gods. They also commonly believe that some (or all) humans possess some supernatural powers (such as the power of levitation). For these reasons, New-Age believers are inclined to view alleged miracles as having been caused by angels, demons, spirits, finite gods, or by humans who possess some supernatural powers. Therfore, Spinoza’s second objection against miracles would make perfect sense to many New-Age believers, even if the New-Age believer also believes that God exists and that God sometimes intervenes in the physical universe.

Buddhists, if they follow the teachings of Buddha, are weak-sense atheists. They reject belief in the existence of God (as conceived of in the Western religions). A basic belief of Buddhism is that everything changes and everything dies (or is eventually destroyed). This basic metaphysical belief rules out the possibility of a person or being that lives eternally, and thus it rules out the existence of God. So, many Buddhists believe that there are no “true miracles” in the sense that there are no physical events that have been brought about by God.

But many Buddhists believe in finite gods, gods who will all eventually die. And many Buddhists believe that gods and spiritually evolved humans possess supernatural powers. Therefore, Spinoza’s second objection against miracles would make sense to many Buddhists. Many Buddhists would infer that alleged miracles were actually brought about by a finite god or by a spiritually evolved human who possessed supernatural powers.

PROBLEM #3: SOME NATURALISTS STRONGLY REJECT THEISM

Craig mistakenly aims his third objection at atheism because he confuses atheism with naturalism and confuses atheism with skepticism. His objection would make more sense if it were aimed at naturalism, because naturalism denies the existence of any and all supernatural beings, powers, and forces, including angels, demons, gods, and humans with supernatural powers.

Does Craig’s third objection have a point, at least in terms of naturalists and naturalism? Even if we focus on just naturalists, Craig’s third objection is still problematic. All naturalists deny that God exists, and that other supernatural beings and supernatural powers exist. However, for many naturalists, including myself, the denial that God exists is a stronger belief than the denial of the existence of other supernatural beings, forces, and powers.

The claim that “God exists” is such a strong claim, in the view of many naturalists, that it seems to be clearly and obviously false. The concept of “God” seems clearly to involve logical contradictions, making the claim “God exists” absurd. The arguments against the existence of God seem very strong and powerful to many naturalists, while the arguments for God seem very weak and defective to many naturalists.

However, the claim that a few human beings in the history of humanity have possessed one or two supernatural powers is a much weaker claim. For many naturalists, there is no clear and obvious logical contradiction in such a claim. Although the evidence supporting such a claim appears to be very weak, it seems to many naturalists that there have been so many humans who have existed over thousands of years that it is difficult to be certain that we have completely ruled out the weak claim that a few of those humans had one or two supernatural powers.

I, as a naturalist, deny that there are any supernatural beings, forces, or powers. However, I have much greater confidence in my denial of the claim “God exists” than I have in my denial that “At least a few human beings have possessed one or two supernatural powers.” I suspect that many naturalists would agree with me, and say they too have much greater confidence in their denial of the existence of God than in their denial that there have been a few humans who possessed one or two supernatural powers.

If many naturalists share this point of view, then I don’t think that Craig has much of a point, even just in relation to naturalists and naturalism. If push comes to shove, and it seems that someone has produced clear and strong evidence that some being has exerted supernatural force to cause a physical event to happen (e.g. a large boulder rises several feet off the ground contrary to the laws of physics), many naturalists (such as myself) would NOT be inclined to infer that this event was a true miracle, that this event was brought about by God. Rather, we would be much more inclined to attribute this event to an angel, a demon, a finite god, or (even more plausibly) to a human who possessed some supernatural power (e.g. the power of levitation).

CONCLUSIONS

Because William Craig’s third objection against Spinoza’s second objection against miracles confuses atheism with naturalism, and confuses atheism with skepticism, and fails to recognize that many naturalists strongly deny the existence of God (even more than other supernatural beings, forces, or powers), Craig’s third objection fails.

I have previously shown that Craig’s first two objections against Spinoza’s second objection against miracles fail. Thus, we may now conclude that all three of Craig’s objections against Spinoza’s second objection against miracles fail, and therefore Craig’s attempt to refute this skeptical objection by Spinoza has failed.