WHERE WE ARE

In a previous post, I pointed out that William Craig had a 20th-century case against the Swoon Theory and that he modified that case sometime in the last decade of the 20th century so that he now has a 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory:

William Craig’s 21st-Century Case Against the Swoon Theory

Craig’s 20th-century case against the Swoon Theory consisted of three objections (for example in his book The Son Rises, hereafter: TSR):

• CRAIG’S OBJECTION #1: Jesus’ Physical Injuries
• CRAIG’S OBJECTION #2: The Sickly Jesus Objection
• CRAIG’S OBJECTION #3: The Deceptive Jesus Objection

In my upcoming book Thinking Critically about the Resurrection of Jesus, Volume 1: The Resuscitation of the Swoon Theory (hereafter: TCAR1, I show that all three of these objections fail, and thus that Craig’s 20th-century case against the Swoon Theory fails.

Craig’s 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory (for example in the 3rd edition of his book Reasonable Faith, hereafter: RF3) includes eight objections. However, six of those objections correspond to objections that were raised by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli in their Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA):

• HCA Objection #7: Who Moved the Stone?
• HCA Objection #5: The Sickly Jesus Objection (same as Craig’s Objection #2 in TSR)
• HCA Objection #1: The Deadliness of Roman Crucifixion.
• HCA Objection #3: Blood and Water.
• HCA Objection #4: Winding Sheets and Entombment.
• HCA Objection #8: Where Did Jesus Go?

In my book TCAR1, I show that all of the objections against the Swoon Theory in HCA fail, including the above six objections. So, in TCAR1, I show that six out of eight of the objections in Craig’s 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory fail. That leaves just two objections to consider:

• Craig’s Objection #1: Jesus’ Physical Injuries (in RF3 and also in TSR)
• Craig’s Contrary to Jewish Thought Objection (the only new objection in RF3)

In my book TCAR1, I show that Craig’s Objection #1 (Jesus’ Physical Injuries) fails, so the only objection that I have not critically examined in TCAR1 is Craig’s Contrary to Jewish Thought Objection (hereafter: Craig’s CJT Objection). Craig’s CJT Objection is the only new objection in Craig’s 21st-century case against the Swoon Theory.

In a recent post, “Critical Evaluation of William Craig’s 21st-Century Case against the Swoon Theory – Part 1“, I argued that we have two good reasons to conclude that Craig’s CJT Objection fails:

• key premise (A) is false, making the core argument for CJT unsound
• key premise (3a) is probably false, because there is a good reason to doubt (3a) and because Craig’s sub-argument for (3a) commits the fallacy of equivocation

FURTHER EVALUATION OF CRAIG’S CJT OBJECTION

Although the two serious problems that I have pointed out with Craig’s CJT Objection make it clear that this objection fails (just like all of the other objections in Craig’s 21st-century case fail), there are other serious problems with the argument that I would like to point out.

PREMISE (3a) VS. THE CHRISTIAN VIEW

Although the core of Craig’s argument clearly fails as an objection against the Swoon Theory because premise (A) is false, it actually works as an objection against the Christian view of the alleged resurrection of Jesus.  It appears that Craig has shot himself in the foot with premise (3a).  Premise (3a) proves too much.

Although premise (A) is false, a very similar claim about the Christian view is true, so Craig’s argument can be turned against his own point of view:

3a. Seeing Jesus alive after his crucifixion (around 30 CE) would lead the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus to believe that Jesus had not died on the cross, not that Jesus was gloriously risen from the dead.

A1. According to the Christian view of Jesus’ alleged resurrection, the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus came to believe that Jesus was gloriously risen from the dead as a result of the eleven remaining disciples seeing Jesus alive after his crucifixion (around 30 CE).

THEREFORE:

2b. The Christian view of Jesus’ alleged resurrection cannot explain why the eleven remaining disciples came to believe that Jesus had gloriously risen from the dead.

If premise (3a) was true, then Craig has produced a strong objection against his own Christian view about the alleged resurrection of Jesus. 

All I have done is substitute references to the Christian view of Jesus’ alleged resurrection in place of Craig’s references to the Swoon Theory.  The above argument uses the exact same logic as Craig’s argument, and it uses premise (3a) without making any changes to it.  So, it appears that Craig, and any other apologist who wishes to maintain and support the Christian view of Jesus’ alleged resurrection, must either reject premise (3a) as being false or reject the logic of the inference from (3a) and (A1) to the conclusion (2b).

But if premise (3a) is false in this argument against the Christian view, then it is also false in Craig’s argument against the Swoon Theory.  Alternatively, if the inference from (3a) and (A1) to the conclusion (2b) is invalid, then the inference from (3a) and (A) to the conclusion (2a) in Craig’s core argument is also invalid.  Either way, there is a serious problem with the core argument for Craig’s CJT Objection.

CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF CRAIG’S CJT OBJECTION

For my careful analysis of Craig’s Contrary to Jewish Thought Objection (CJT), see this post:

Careful Analysis of Objections to the Swoon Theory: Objection #10 (Jewish Thought)

My critical evaluation of this new and unique objection against the Swoon Theory by Craig will be based on the careful analysis of his argument in the above post.

FURTHER CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENT FOR (3a)

Here, again, is the sub-argument given to support premise (3a):

4a. It is contrary to 1st-century Jewish thought to believe that Jesus had died on the cross (around 30 CE) and then to believe that Jesus had gloriously risen from the dead (less than 48 hours later).

B. The primary influence on the religious beliefs of the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus was 1st-century Jewish thought.

THEREFORE:

3a. Seeing Jesus alive after his crucifixion (around 30 CE) would lead the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus to believe that Jesus had not died on the cross, not that Jesus was gloriously risen from the dead.

On one understanding of the phrase “1st-century Jewish thought”, premise (4a) appears to be false. Because Jesus was a 1st-century Jewish preacher and teacher, we can consider the ideas in the teaching and preaching of Jesus to automatically be part of “1st-century Jewish thought”.

According to the Gospels, Jesus taught his disciples on more than one occasion that he would be killed but would rise from the dead a short time later (i.e. before the end of the world). Craig and most Evangelical Christians believe the Gospels on this point. But if Jesus did teach that to his disciples, then a part of “1st-century Jewish thought” is this idea presented by Jesus that he would be killed and then a short time later would rise from the dead. Thus, it cannot be contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought” for a disciple of Jesus “to believe that Jesus had died on the cross…and then to believe that Jesus had gloriously risen from the dead…”.

One could try to escape this problem by simply rejecting the Gospel accounts about Jesus repeatedly telling his disciples that he would be killed and then would rise from the dead a short time later. But taking this approach involves the implication that the Gospels provide unreliable accounts of events in the life of Jesus, and that would undermine almost all of Craig’s objections against the Swoon Theory because most of his objections require the assumption that the Gospels provide reliable accounts of events in the life of Jesus.

Alternatively, one could adopt a different understanding of the phrase “1st-century Jewish thought”. For example, one could say that any belief that is contrary to the beliefs held by most 1st-century Jews is a belief that is contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought”. On that understanding, it would be possible for Jesus to teach or preach an idea that was contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought”. On this interpretation of the phrase “1st-century Jewish thought”, Jesus teaching his disciples that he would be killed and then God would raise him from the dead a short time later (i.e. before the end of the world) could potentially be an idea that was contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought”.

I have previously pointed out one serious problem with this understanding of the phrase “1st-century Jewish thought”, namely, that on this interpretation, we would have to reject premise (B) as false because the ideas in the preaching and teaching of Jesus would obviously have a greater influence on the beliefs of Jesus’ disciples than the influence of the beliefs accepted by most 1st-century Jews.

Setting aside the implication that the key premise (B) is false, there is another problem with premise (4a) if we understand the phrase “1st-century Jewish thought” to mean the beliefs or values accepted by most 1st-century Jews.

THE SUB-ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (4a)

Here are the last two inferences of the sub-argument for the conclusion (4a):

F. In 1st-century Jewish thought, the resurrection differs in a fundamental respect from the alleged resurrection of Jesus (in terms of its timing relative to the end of the world).

I. In 1st-century Jewish thought, the resurrection differs in a fundamental respect from the alleged resurrection of Jesus (in terms of how many others were resurrected at the same time).

THEREFORE:

5a. In 1st-century Jewish thought, the conception of the resurrection differed in at least two fundamental respects from the alleged resurrection of Jesus.

C. IF the alleged resurrection of Jesus occurred, THEN Jesus died on the cross (around 30 CE) and then Jesus gloriously rose from the dead (less than 48 hours later).

THEREFORE:

4a. It is contrary to 1st-century Jewish thought to believe that Jesus had died on the cross (around 30 CE) and then to believe that Jesus had gloriously risen from the dead (less than 48 hours later).

Premise (4a) asserts an historical claim, and that claim is based upon the historical claim (5a). Premise (5a) is in turn based upon the historical claims (F) and (I). Thus, if one or both of the historical claims (F) and (I) are false or dubious, then Craig has failed to provide a good reason to believe that the historical claim (4a) is true, which would mean that (4a) is dubious and the sub-argument for the key premise (3a) should be rejected.

Neither (F) nor (I) are obviously true, so Craig must provide strong and solid arguments to show that historical claims (F) and (I) are both true. Otherwise, he fails to show that the historical claim (4a) is true, and thus fails to show that the key premise (3a) is true, and therefore the CJT Objection against the Swoon Theory would fail for that reason.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR PREMISES (F) AND (I)

Craig’s argument for his CJT Objection includes sub-arguments for (F) and (I). The diagram of the sub-argument for premise (4a) shows that ultimately, the argument is based upon four basic premises (circled in blue):

There might also be problems with the inferences in this sub-argument for (F) or (I), but if the logic of the sub-arguments is OK, then whether these are good and solid arguments for (F) and (I) depends on whether these four basic premises are true or false: (6a), (7a), (E), and (H). If any of those basic premises are false or dubious, then the sub-arguments for (F) or (I) should be rejected, and that would mean that Craig has failed to provide a good reason to believe that (4a) is true, and therefore, Craig’s CJT Objection against the Swoon Theory would fail.

EVALUATION OF PREMISES (6a) and (7a)

Here are two key historical claims that Craig’s sub-argument for (4a) rests upon:

6a. In 1st-century Jewish thought, the resurrection always occurred after the end of the world.

7a. In 1st-century Jewish thought, the resurrection was always the resurrection of all the righteous or all the people.

Recall that the phrase “1st-century Jewish thought” needed clarification in order to allow for a distinction to be drawn between beliefs that Jesus taught and preached on the one hand, and “1st-century Jewish thought” on the other hand. A plausible interpretation of this phrase that allows for us to distinguish the teaching of Jesus from “1st-centutury Jewish thought” is this:

DEFINITION #1

The belief that P is the case is part of 1st-century Jewish thought IF AND ONLY IF:
most 1st-century Jews believed that P was the case.

It is possible that Jesus taught or preached some ideas that were contrary to what most 1st-century Jews believed. Thus, this clarification makes room for the possibility that Jesus taught or preached some ideas that were contrary to “1st-century Jewish thought”.

Given this understanding of the key phrase in Craig’s argument, we can clarify the meaning of the basic historical claims (6a) and (7a):

(6b) Most 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world.

(7b) Most 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of all people (or all righteous people) would occur at the same time.

The problem that Craig raises is that if the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus believed that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world, and that the resurrection of all people (or all righteous people) would occur at the same time, then this would prevent them from believing that one single individual (such as Jesus) would rise from the dead before the end of the world took place.

PREMISES (6b) and (7b) ARE TOO WEAK

Before we attempt to evaluate the truth or falsehood of the basic historical claims (6b) and (7b), it is important to notice that these claims are too weak to be the basis for a strong and solid argument against the Swoon Theory.

The word “most” can reasonably be understood to mean “more than 50%”. If that is how we understand the meaning of the word “most” in premises (6b) and (7b), then these historical claims are too weak to provide the basis for a strong objection against the Swoon Theory.

Suppose that 51% of 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world. In that case, premise (6b) would be true. But in that case, there would be a good chance that five or six of the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus did NOT believe that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world.

Remember the Swoon Theory does not require that all eleven remaining disciples of Jesus saw him alive after his crucifixion, nor that all eleven remaining disciples became firm believers in the resurrection of Jesus because of such experiences. If just one or two of the eleven remaining disciples saw Jesus alive after his crucifixion, and if just the one or two disciples became firm believers in the resurrection of Jesus because of such experiences, and if the one or two disciples were charismatic preachers or evangelists who persuaded dozens or hundreds of their fellow Jews to also believe that God had raised Jesus from the dead, then that would be enough to make the Swoon Theory true and correct, assuming the Jesus that the one or two disciples saw after the crucifixion had not died on the cross, but had merely survived the crucifixion.

Craig would commit the STRAW MAN fallacy if he insisted that the Swoon Theory asserts or implies that all eleven remaining disciples of Jesus experienced a living Jesus after his crucifixion and that all eleven disciples became firmly convinced that God had raised Jesus from the dead on the basis of such experiences.

Because the word “most” can reasonably be understood to mean “more than 50%”, the historical claims (6b) and (7b) are too weak to be the basis for a strong argument against the Swoon Theory. So, Craig’s CJT Objection fails even if (6b) and (7b) were true historical claims.

STRONGER VERSIONS OF PREMISES (6a) and (7a)

If Craig’s CJT Objection is to have any hope of being a strong objection against the Swoon Theory, then the basic historical claims in his sub-argument for premise (4a) will need to be stronger than (6b) and (7b). We will need to re-define the key phrase “1st-century Jewish thought” in a way that requires more than just that 51% of 1st-century Jews accepted a particular belief. Let’s begin by increasing the percentage required to “at least 80%”:

DEFINITION #2

The belief that P is the case is part of 1st-century Jewish thought IF AND ONLY IF:
at least 80% of 1st-century Jews believed that P was the case.

Given this new definition of “1st-century Jewish thought”, we can clarify the historical claims (6a) and (7a) so that they make stronger claims than the weak historical claims (6b) and (7b):

(6c) At least 80% of 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world.

(7c) At least 80% of 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of all people (or all righteous people) would occur at the same time.

Although historical claims (6c) and (7c) are clearly stronger than claims (6b) and (7b), they are still too weak to do the job that Craig needs them to do. Even if (6c) and (7c) were true, they still would not provide a solid basis for Craig’s CJT Objection against the Swoon Theory.

Once again, the Swoon Theory does NOT require that all eleven remaining disciples of Jesus had experiences of a living Jesus after his crucifixion, nor that all eleven disciples became firm believers that God had raised Jesus from the dead on the basis of such experiences.

Even supposing that 80% of 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world, that would mean that 20% of 1st-century Jews would NOT have held such a belief. That is basically two out of ten 1st-century Jews who would not have had this belief. So, even if (6c) were true, there would still be a good chance that two or three of the eleven disciples did NOT believe that the resurrection of people would only take place after the end of the world. If only two or three of the remaining eleven disciples of Jesus were open to the possibility that Jesus would rise from the dead before the end of the world, that is all that the Swoon Theory needs.

Thus, although historical claims (6c) and (7c) are significantly stronger than claims (6b) and (7b), they are still not strong enough to be the basis of a solid objection against the Swoon Theory. Even if we assume that (6c) and (7c) are true historical claims, Craig’s CJT Objection against the Swoon Theory would still fail.

VERY STRONG VERSIONS OF PREMISES (6a) and (7a)

Let’s revise the definition of “1st-century Jewish thought” one more time, to make the base historical claims of Craig’s argument for premise (4a) into very strong claims:

DEFINITION #3

The belief that P is the case is part of 1st-century Jewish thought IF AND ONLY IF:
at least 90% of 1st-century Jews believed that P was the case.

Given this revised definition of “1st-century Jewish thought”, we can clarify premises (6a) and (7a) so that they make even stronger historical claims than (6c) and (7c):

(6d) At least 90% of 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world.

(7d) At least 90% of 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of all people (or all righteous people) would occur at the same time.

Although premises (6d) and (7d) make very strong historical claims, they still fall short of providing a solid basis for a strong objection against the Swoon Theory.

Even if we assume that these two very strong historical claims are both true, they are still not sufficient to make Craig’s CJT Objection a strong and solid objection. Based on my calculations, if 90% of 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world, if we randomly selected eleven people from the group of 1st-century Jews, there is about a 70% chance that at least one of those eleven people would NOT hold this belief about resurrection. (After the conclusion of this article, there is one more section that presents the mathematical probability calculations that show that there is about a 70% chance that a random selection of eleven people from the group of 1st-century Jews would include at least one person who would NOT hold this belief about resurrection).

Furthermore, there are good reasons to believe that the disciples of Jesus do NOT represent a random selection of 1st-century Jews, but rather that there was a significant bias against their holding the beliefs that Craig implies that they held. The teaching and preaching of Jesus was contrary to the allegedly widespread beliefs about resurrection claimed by Craig. Thus, there were two significant biases against Jesus’ inner-circle of disciples holding those allegedly widespread beliefs about resurrection:

• People who admired Jesus and who wanted to follow him as their religious leader and guide would have tended to have similar religious beliefs to what Jesus taught and preached.
• In selecting specific admirers or followers to be part of his inner-circle of disciples, Jesus would have tended to select people who had similar religious beliefs to what he taught and preached.

Because of these biases in favor of the selection of disciples who would tend to have religious beliefs similar to what Jesus taught and preached, we have good reason to believe that the probability of there being at least one of the eleven remaining disciples of Jesus who did NOT hold the belief that the resurrection of people would only happen after the end of the world was significantly higher than the probability of this happening if the eleven had been selected purely at random from among 1st-century Jews.

Therefore, we have good reason to believe that the probability of at least one of the eleven disciples NOT holding the belief that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world was significantly higher than the 70% probability of this happening on the basis of a random selection of people from among 1st-century Jews.

So, even if the very strong historical claim (6d) is assumed to be true, there would still be about an 80% chance that one or two of the eleven remaining disciples would have been open to the possibility of Jesus rising from the dead before the end of the world.

The Swoon Theory does NOT require all eleven disciples saw Jesus alive after his crucifixion, nor does it require all eleven disciples to have firmly believed that God raised Jesus from the dead on the basis of such experiences. If just one or two disciples had such experiences and firmly believed in the resurrection of Jesus on that basis, that would be sufficient for the Swoon Theory to be true or correct, assuming the Jesus they saw had not died on the cross but had survived his crucifixion.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS ABOUT RESURRECTION

My argument above that the disciples of Jesus were NOT randomly selected from among 1st-century Jews, but that there were biases in favor of them NOT accepting the common beliefs about resurrection that Craig describes, is based on the assumption that Jesus taught things that were contrary to the common beliefs about resurrection. For those who are not familiar with the teachings of Jesus as presented in the Gospels, I will now provide evidence that Jesus taught or said things contrary to the common beliefs about resurrection that are mentioned in premises (6d) and (7d).

Here are the key points:

• Jesus claimed he could raise individuals from the dead (before the end of the world)
• Jesus supposedly raised individuals from the dead (before the end of the world)
• Jesus taught his disciples to raise individuals from the dead (before the end of the world)
• Jesus repeatedly claimed that he would be killed and then God would raise him from the dead (as a single individual) shortly after he was killed (before the end of the world)

Given these claims that are based on the Gospels, the teachings of Jesus about resurrection were contrary to the common 1st-century beliefs about resurrection that are mentioned in premises (6d) and (7d).

Jesus claimed he could raise individuals from the dead, before the end of the world:

4 Jesus answered them, “Go and tell John what you hear and see: 5 the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, those with a skin disease are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the poor have good news brought to them. 6 And blessed is anyone who takes no offense at me.” (Matthew 11:4-6, NRSV Updated Edition)

21 Jesus had just then cured many people of diseases, afflictions, and evil spirits and had given sight to many who were blind. 22 And he answered them, “Go and tell John what you have seen and heard: the blind receive their sight; the lame walk; those with a skin disease are cleansed; the deaf hear; the dead are raised; the poor have good news brought to them. 23 And blessed is anyone who takes no offense at me.”
(Luke 7:21-23, NRSV Updated Edition)

According to the Gospels, Jesus raised individuals from the dead (before the end of the world):

35 While he was still speaking, some people came from the synagogue leader’s house to say, “Your daughter is dead. Why trouble the teacher any further?” 36 But overhearing what they said, Jesus said to the synagogue leader, “Do not be afraid; only believe.” 37 He allowed no one to follow him except Peter, James, and John, the brother of James. 38 When they came to the synagogue leader’s house, he saw a commotion, people weeping and wailing loudly. 39 When he had entered, he said to them, “Why do you make a commotion and weep? The child is not dead but sleeping.” 40 And they laughed at him. Then he put them all outside and took the child’s father and mother and those who were with him and went in where the child was. 41 Taking her by the hand, he said to her, “Talitha koum,” which means, “Little girl, get up!” 42 And immediately the girl stood up and began to walk about (she was twelve years of age). At this they were overcome with amazement. (Mark 5:35-42, NRSV Updated Edition)

11 Soon afterward he went to a town called Nain, and his disciples and a large crowd went with him. 12 As he approached the gate of the town, a man who had died was being carried out. He was his mother’s only son, and she was a widow, and with her was a large crowd from the town. 13 When the Lord saw her, he was moved with compassion for her and said to her, “Do not cry.” 14 Then he came forward and touched the bier, and the bearers stopped. And he said, “Young man, I say to you, rise!” 15 The dead man sat up and began to speak, and Jesus gave him to his mother.
(Luke 7:11-15, NRSV Updated Edition)

38 Then Jesus, again greatly disturbed, came to the tomb. It was a cave, and a stone was lying against it. 39 Jesus said, “Take away the stone.” Martha, the sister of the dead man, said to him, “Lord, already there is a stench because he has been dead four days.” 40 Jesus said to her, “Did I not tell you that if you believed you would see the glory of God?” 41 So they took away the stone. And Jesus looked upward and said, “Father, I thank you for having heard me. 42 I knew that you always hear me, but I have said this for the sake of the crowd standing here, so that they may believe that you sent me.” 43 When he had said this, he cried with a loud voice, “Lazarus, come out!” 44 The dead man came out, his hands and feet bound with strips of cloth and his face wrapped in a cloth. Jesus said to them, “Unbind him, and let him go.” (John 11:38-44, NRSV Updated Edition)

Jesus taught his disciples to raise individuals from the dead (before the end of the world):

5 These twelve Jesus sent out with the following instructions: “Do not take a road leading to gentiles, and do not enter a Samaritan town, 6 but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. 7 As you go, proclaim the good news, ‘The kingdom of heaven has come near.’ 8 Cure the sick; raise the dead; cleanse those with a skin disease; cast out demons. You received without payment; give without payment.
(Matthew 10:5-8, NRSV Updated Edition)

Jesus repeatedly claimed that he would be killed and then God would raise him from the dead (as a single individual) shortly after he was killed (before the end of the world):

31 Then he began to teach them that the Son of Man must undergo great suffering and be rejected by the elders, the chief priests, and the scribes and be killed and after three days rise again. (Mark 8:31, NRSV Updated Edition)

30 They went on from there and passed through Galilee. He did not want anyone to know it, 31 for he was teaching his disciples, saying to them, “The Son of Man is to be betrayed into human hands, and they will kill him, and three days after being killed, he will rise again.” (Mark 9:30-31, NRSV Updated Edition)

³³ saying, “Look, we are going up to Jerusalem, and the Son of Man will be handed over to the chief priests and the scribes, and they will condemn him to death; then they will hand him over to the gentiles; ³⁴ they will mock him and spit upon him and flog him and kill him, and after three days he will rise again.” (Mark 10:33-34, NRSV Updated Edition)

Based on what the Gospels tell us Jesus said, taught, and did about resurrection, it is clear that Jesus said, taught, and did things that were contrary to the common beliefs of 1st-century Jews that are mentioned in premises (6d) and (7d).

CONCLUSIONS

In Part 1 of this series of posts, I showed that there were at least two major problems with Craig’s CJT Objection:

• key premise (A) is false, making the core argument for CJT unsound
• key premise (3a) is probably false, because there is a good reason to doubt (3a) and because Craig’s sub-argument for (3a) commits the fallacy of equivocation

So, Part 1 gave us good reason to conclude that Craig’s CJT Objection against the Swoon Theory fails.

In Part 2 (above), I showed that while premise (3a) fails as an objection against the Swoon Theory, because premise (A) is false, premise (3a) does work as an objection against Craig’s Christian view of the alleged resurrection of Jesus. That means that he, and other Christian apologists, must either reject premise (3a) as false, or else reject the logic of his core CJT argument as being invalid. Otherwise, Craig shoots himself in the foot with premise (3a).

In Part 2, I argued that premise (B) is false, and thus that the argument for the key premise (3a) is unsound. Therefore, Craig has failed to provide a good reason to believe that premise (3a) is true, so (3a) is dubious and might well be false. This is another good reason to conclude that Craig’s CJT Objection fails.

In Part 2 of this series, we have also looked at three different definitions of the key phrase “1st-century Jewish thought” and we have seen that Craig’s CJT Objection against the Swoon Theory fails on all three interpretations of that phrase. The basic historical claims upon which Craig’s CJT Objection are based are too weak to be the basis for a solid objection against the Swoon Theory. Even if the two main historical claims that are the foundation of Craig’s CJT Objection were both true, this objection still fails.

In Part 3 (the next post in this series), I will argue that the very strong versions of the historical claims that are the basis for Craig’s CJT Objection are dubious at best, and are probably false, giving us yet another good reason to conclude that Craig’s CJT Objection against the Swoon Theory fails.

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THE PROBABILITY THAT AT LEAST ONE OF ELEVEN RANDOMLY SELECTED 1ST-CENTURY JEWS WOULD NOT HOLD THE COMMON BELIEF THAT THE RESURRECTION OF PEOPLE WILL ONLY OCCUR AFTER THE END OF THE WORLD

The strongest version of premise (6a) that we considered above was this:

(6d) At least 90% of 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world.

Suppose this very strong version of premise (6a) was true and that 90% of 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world. Given this assumption, what is the probability that at least one of the eleven randomly selected people would NOT believe that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world?

There is a handy method for figuring out the probability that “at least one” member of a set would have a specific characteristic, and I will use that method here in order to make the probability calculation a bit simpler and easier.

This method is based on the following bit of logic:

EITHER

a. NONE of the members of the set have characteristic X

OR

b. AT LEAST ONE of the members of the set have characteristic X.

Those two possibilities include ALL logical possibilities. Therefore, we know in advance that one of these two possibilities MUST be the case. That is to say, it is CERTAIN that one or the other of these two possibilities is true. In probability calculations, the idea that something is CERTAIN means that it has a probability of 1. So, we know in advance that the probability that either (a) or (b) will occur is 1, because it is CERTAIN that either (a) or (b) will occur.

Based on this logic, there is a simple mathematical relationship between the probability that (a) will occur and the probability that (b) will occur. The probability that (a) will occur PLUS the probability that (b) will occur EQUALS 1:

P(a) + P(b) = 1

If we subtract the probability of (a) occurring from both sides of this equation, we arrive at a very useful formula:

P(b) = 1 – P(a)

This means that we can subtract the probability that (a) will occur from 1 in order to determine the probability that (b) will occur. It is simpler and easier to figure out the probability that NONE of the members of the set will have characteristic X than to figure out the probability that AT LEAST ONE of the members of the set will have characteristic X. So, this second formula allows us to do the simpler and easier probability calculation first, namely P(a), and then use that probability to determine the other probability, namely P(b).

According to the strong historical claim (6d) at least 90% or 9 out of 10 1st-century Jews believed that the resurrection of people will only occur after the end of the world. Assuming that 9 out of 10 1st-century Jews held this common belief about resurrection, each person randomly selected from the group of 1st-century Jews would have 9 chances in 10 of holding this common belief about resurrection. That is a probability of .9.

Based on the assumption that 90% of 1st-century Jews held this common belief about resurrection, the probability that all eleven randomly selected people from the group of 1st-century Jews would hold this common belief about resurrection would be this:

.9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 =

.81 x .81 x .81 x .81 x .81 x .9 =

.6561 x .6561 x .81 x .9 =

.43046721 x .729 = .31381059609

approximately = .31

If all 11 randomly selected people held this common belief about resurrection, then NONE of them would NOT hold this common belief about resurrection. So, the probability calculation here will give us the probability of (a), where (a) means that NONE of the members of the selected set have the characteristic that they do NOT hold this common belief about resurrection. Thus, the probability that NONE of eleven people selected randomly from among 1st-century Jews would NOT hold this common belief about resurrection is about .31.

P(a) = .31

THEREFORE:

P(b) = 1 – .31

P(b) = .69

The probability that at least one of eleven people randomly selected from the group of 1st-century Jews would NOT hold this common belief about resurrection is .69 or about .7, which means there would be about a 70% chance of this being the case, assuming that 90% of 1st-century Jews held this standard belief that the resurrection of people would only occur after the end of the world.

In short, there is a very good chance that one or two of the eleven remaining disciples would NOT have this common Jewish belief about resurrection and thus would be open to the possibility of God raising Jesus from the dead BEFORE the end of the world. Therefore, Craig’s CJT Objection against the Swoon Theory fails.