Evaluation of Definitions of the Word “Miracle”- Part 3: Aquinas & Hume on Miracles & Nature
BASELINE AND EXCEPTION ELEMENTS
I have analyzed eight different definitions of the word “miracle” into seven elements:
Two elements found in most definitions are what I call the “Baseline” and “Exception” elements:
BASELINE – the ordinary or normal circumstances from which a miracle departs
EXCEPTION – the way in which a miracle departs from ordinary or normal circumstances
Only the definition by the Christian philosopher C. Stephen Evans lacks these two elements:
An event brought about by a special act of God.
(Pocket Dictionary of Apologetics & Philosophy of Religion, Downers Grove, Illinois: Intervarsity Press, 2002, p.76.)
I find the clarity and simplicity of Evans’ definition appealing, but before I toss aside these two elements (baseline and exception), I will try to determine the REASON why Aquinas and Hume include these two elements in their definitions of “miracle”.
AQUINAS AND HUME ON MIRACLES AND NATURE
Much philosophical discussion about miracles has roots in the writings of Aquinas and Hume about miracles. Aquinas relates miracles to nature and the natural order, and Hume relates miracles to laws of nature. So, before we toss out the baseline and exception elements of definitions of the word “miracle”, we should figure out, if possible, why Aquinas and Hume contrast miracles with the natural order and with natural laws. Does Aquinas have a good reason for contrasting miracles with the natural order? Does Hume have a good reason for contrasting miracles with natural laws?
AQUINAS, MIRACLES & THE NATURAL ORDER
My exposition here on the views of Aquinas about miracles are based on an excerpt from Summa Contra Gentiles (from 3.99.9 to 3.102.3) printed in Miracles (p.19-22), a collection of philosophical readings edited by Richard Swinburne.
Aquinas argues that only God can perform miracles. His argument is based on the idea that miracles must be AMAZING and that an event is AMAZING when we don’t understand the cause of an event. Sometimes, some people are AMAZED by an event because they are ignorant about the cause of the event, but other people are not AMAZED by the same event because they understand the cause of that event.
So, Aquinas argues that to be truly AMAZING, an event should be one such that no human being can understand the cause of the event, and according to Aquinas that only happens when God is the cause of an event. God is infinite and beyond human comprehension, so human beings are not able to understand the cause of an event, when God is the cause.
According to Aquinas, God created everything that exists other than himself. In creating things, God gave those things different characteristics and different powers. In assigning different creatures different powers, God created the natural order. Humans, for example, can breathe air, but cannot breathe water. But fish can breathe water, but not air. But God is not constrained by the limitations of his finite creatures. God is infinite in both knowledge and in power, so God can cause events that finite things cannot cause.
Because God is infinite, we finite humans cannot fully understand God, and thus cannot understand the cause of an event which was caused by God. Since a miracle is an objectively AMAZING event, that is, an event that must be AMAZING to any and all human beings, a miracle must be an event that has a cause that no human can fully understand. But God is the only infinite being, the only being that it is impossible for humans to fully understand, so only God can bring about an objectively AMAZING event. Therefore, only God can bring about a miracle.
Creatures can cause events to occur, but the causal powers of a creature were given to it by God, and those powers are limited and finite. The limited and finite powers of creatures constitute the order of nature. Because the powers of creatures were given to them by God, creatures are unable to bring about events that are above the order of nature. But God, as the infinite creator of all creatures is able to bring about events that are above the order of nature. Therefore, if an event occurs that is above the order of nature, then that event must have been caused by God, not by a limited and finite creature. Any event that is above the order of nature is thus a miracle, according to Aquinas.
Aquinas appears to have a couple of arguments for the conclusion that only God can bring about a miracle. One argument is based on the assumption that God cannot be fully understood by humans (because God is infinite). The other argument is based on the assumption that no finite being can cause an event that is above the order of nature.
I think both of these arguments are bad arguments, and that Aquinas fails to show that only God can bring about a miracle. I reject the assumption by Aquinas that a miracle must be an objectively amazing event, and I reject the inference of Aquinas that a miracle must be caused by something that is beyond human comprehension. I also have doubts about his claim that God cannot be fully understood by human beings based on the fact that God is an infinite being. In any case, his argument here is controversial and is therefore inappropriate to incorporate into an acceptable definition of the word “miracle”.
His other argument about some events being above the order of nature, also involves controversial or dubious assumptions that are inappropriate to incorporate into an acceptable definition of the word “miracle”. God, if God exists, is the creator of every other being (with the possible exception of numbers, mathematical truths, concepts of logic, and logical truths), but this does NOT imply that God designed every other being by specifying the characteristics and powers of each being.
For example, God did not design or create the atomic bomb. Humans designed and created the atomic bomb. God did not design the atomic bomb, nor assign the characteristics and powers of the atomic bomb (although God, if God exists, probably designed the characteristics and powers of Uranium that made the creation of atomic bombs possible). The characteristics and powers of atomic bombs were brought into being by human creators/designers, not by God.
Furthermore, the first forms of life arose on Earth out of natural chemical processes, and the first single-celled organisms evolved into all of the different kinds of plants and animals that we have today, so God did NOT design each plant or animal and assign each creature specific characteristics and powers. The characteristics and powers of living things on this planet are the result of random genetic mutations and changes that were shaped by natural selection. Therefore, if God exists, then there is an infinite creator of the universe, but it is not the case that each of the things in the universe were specifically designed by God to have the characteristics and powers that they in fact have.
Aquinas was wrong to assume that every finite thing or being in the universe has the characteristics and powers it has because God specifically designed and created each finite thing or being in the universe to have specific characteristics and powers. Even if we grant the assumption that God exists, this view of the order of nature is false.
Also, God, if God exists, is omnipotent, so God, if God exists, could create another being with fantastic god-like powers. No human being can levitate himself or herself. But angels, if angels exist, can levitate themselves. Such a god-like power means that angels can cause events that are above the order of nature. Aquinas would probably object that if God gives angels the power of levitation, then it is only “natural” for an angel to, on some occasions, cause itself to levitate.
But if this is how Aquinas hoped to get around the possibility that angels and other finite creatures could perform miracles, then he has clearly failed. No matter how fantastic an event might appear to be, one could always say “God gave angels the power to do X” (or “God gave that person the power to do X”), where the power to do X is a fantastic god-like power (such as the power of levitation). Because such a move can always be made, it becomes impossible to distinguish between events that are “above the order of nature” and events that are “in accordance with the order of nature”.
Aquinas gives us REASONS to believe that only God could perform a miracle. But his reasons are controversial at best, and they appear to be BAD REASONS. So, it would not be acceptable to build this reasoning of Aquinas into a definition of the word “miracle”.
Finally, while Aquinas prefers to view miracles as exceptions to the natural order, Hume prefers to view miracles as exceptions to the laws of nature. So, if we define the word “miracle” in terms of “the natural order” then we bias the definition in favor of a Thomist view of miracles. But, if we define the word “miracle” in terms of exceptions to “the laws of nature”, then we bias the definition in favor of Hume’s view of miracles. Either way, we are incorporating controversial philosophical assumptions into our definition of the word “miracle”.
I no longer see the need to examine why Hume felt it necessary to define the word “miracle” in terms of exceptions to the laws of nature. Such a definition would build Hume’s controversial understanding about miracles into the definition of the word “miracle”, and that is not acceptable. A definition ought not assume that a particular philosophical theory is correct. It might well be the case that Hume’s understanding about miracles is best or better than the view of miracles put forward by Aquinas, but such a conclusion should not be built into a definition of the word “miracle”, at least not for use in the evaluation of Christian claims about how some alleged miracle or miracles support a basic Christian belief.
CONCLUSION ABOUT THE ELEMENTS OF BASELINE & EXCEPTION
The two main contenders for the element of baseline in definitions of the word “miracle” are Aquinas’ idea of “the natural order” and Hume’s idea of “the natural laws”. However, both baselines are controversial and problematic. If we define the word “miracle” in terms of exceptions to “the natural order”, then we import controversial and dubious assumptions from the Thomist view of miracles into our definition. But if we define the word “miracle” in terms of exceptions to “the laws of nature”, then we import controversial and problematic assumptions of Hume’s view into our definition. The definition of the word “miracle” should not assume the correctness of either philosophical theory or viewpoint.
Because neither option would produce an acceptable definition of the word “miracles”, we should go with the simpler and clearer approach taken by the Christian philosopher C. Stephan Evans, and drop both the baseline and exception elements out of the definition of the word “miracle”, and thus allow the conflicting philosophical views (esp. Aquinas v. Hume) to be argued independently of how we define this key word.
Aquinas was intent on arguing for the claim that only God can perform miracles. I, however, suggest that we simply STIPULATE that a miracle is an event caused by God. The problem that Aquinas was concerned about still remains, but in a slightly different form. He no longer has to argue that only God can perform miracles, but he, and other defenders of Christianity, still has to argue that some alleged miracles were events caused by God and not caused by angels, demons, finite deities, psychics, witches or wizards. Aquinas is still free to use arguments about finite beings and what an infinite being can do that finite beings cannot do. Aquinas is still free to use arguments about there being a natural order, and about how some events are “above the natural order” in order to try to show that some particular event was caused by God.
A Christian philosopher, like Swinburne, who accepts Hume’s concept of miracles, is also free to use the concept of “the laws of nature” and exceptions to the laws of nature in order to argue that specific alleged miracles were in fact events that had been brought about by God. So, a simpler and clearer definition of the word “miracles” does not prevent anyone from taking Hume’s understanding of miracles and using that view as part of an argument from a miracle (or miracles) as proof of some basic Christian belief.