WHERE WE ARE

In my initial post, I analyzed eight definitions of the word “miracle” into seven different elements. I am not satisfied with any of these definitions, so in my previous post I began to evaluate these definitions to make clear the problems I see with them. In this current post, I will continue to evaluate these definitions in relation to these three elements:

AGENT/CAUSE – the person(s) or kind of being(s) or kind of thing(s) that brings about a miracle

EXCEPTION – the way in which a miracle departs from ordinary or normal circumstances

BASELINE – the ordinary or normal circumstances from which a miracle departs

In a later post, I will attempt to construct a definition that preserves the insights in the existing definitions but that avoids the various problems that I point out with these definitions.

MY ANALYSIS OF EIGHT DEFINITIONS OF THE WORD “MIRACLE”

Here is the table that represents my analysis of eight definitions of “miracle”:

THE AGENT/CAUSE ELEMENT

The next element of these definitions to consider is the agent/cause element:

AGENT/CAUSE – the person(s) or kind of being(s) or kind of thing(s) that brings about a miracle

The definition by Habermas has the broadest requirement for the cause of a miracle:

accomplished by some type of supernatural activity

Although the word “activity” suggests an action by a person or agent, it could also be used in relation to the operation of an impersonal force (like magic or Karma). So, this element of the definition by Habermas does not require that a personal being or an agent be the cause of an event in order for that event to constitute a miracle.

The definitions by Swinburne and Hume are more constrained in the sort of cause they require for something to be a miracle:

• by a god (Swinburne)
• the Deity…or some invisible agent (Hume)

I take it that the descriptions of this element by Swinburne and Hume are roughly equivalent to each other. God, if God exists, is a god. So, Swinburne’s description means: either God or a finite god. The phrase “the Deity” in Hume’s description means “God”, and “some invisible agent” is roughly equivalent to Swinburne’s term “a god”. If we understand “a god” to mean an invisible agent that has superhuman power, then there could be some invisible agents who lack superhuman power and thus are not gods. So, this element of Swinburne’s definition is a little bit narrower than this element in Hume’s definition.

Flew has a vague requirement for the cause of a miracle:

divine power

The definitions by Purtill, Kreeft & Tacelli, Evans, and Geisler have the narrowest requirement for the cause of an event in order for the event to count as a miracle:

God

We have quite a range of options for this element of the definition of the word “miracle”. On the one extreme, we have the broad requirement by Habermas that allows the cause of a miracle to be a person or agent or even to be an impersonal force. On the other extreme, we have a number of definitions that require a very specific agent to be the cause: God. And between these extremes we have the similar characterizations of the cause as an invisible or supernatural sort of agent. I don’t care for Flew’s unclear requirement that an event be caused by “divine power”.

In order to choose between these options, we need to be clear about the kind of definition we are seeking. On the one hand, we might want a definition that accurately describes how the word “miracle” is generally used, its meaning in ordinary language. Alternatively, we might want a definition that is helpful to use in a particular intellectual context.

In terms of how the word “miracle” is generally used, I think the broadest requirement, given in the definition by Habermas is best:

accomplished by some type of supernatural activity

The ordinary-language meaning of the word “miracle” allows for a broad range of causes, even impersonal causes like magic or Karma.

However, in the context of discussions about the truth of the Christian religion or about the truth of a basic Christian belief (e.g. the existence of God, the divinity of Jesus, or the inspiration of the Bible), any “miracle” that is caused by something or some agent other than God is of no significance. If a Christian apologist wants to use miracles as evidence for a Christian belief, then the only sort of miracle that is RELEVANT is one where God was the cause of the event in question.

Therefore, whenever there is a discussion about the truth of Christianity or the truth of a Christian belief and alleged miracles are put forward as EVIDENCE supporting Christianity or a Christian belief, then it makes good sense to restrict the CAUSE of a miracle to God, and this can and should be done by means of a DEFINITION that requires God to be the cause of an event in order for that event to be considered a “miracle”.

In short, in the context of discussions about the truth of Christianity or Christian beliefs, we should stipulate a definition that is narrower than the ordinary or common meaning of the word “miracle”.

THE BASELINE and EXCEPTION ELEMENTS

I am now going to examine the baseline and exception elements in definitions of “miracle”:

BASELINE – the ordinary or normal circumstances from which a miracle departs

EXCEPTION – the way in which a miracle departs from ordinary or normal circumstances

Swinburne, Habermas, Hume, and Flew all point to basically the same baseline element but use different terms for the exception element:

• a transgression of a law of nature (Hume)
• a violation of a law of nature (Swinburne)
• interferes with, but does not violate, the laws of nature (Habermas)
• the suspension or alteration of the normal working of the laws of nature (Flew)

Purtill, Kreeft & Tacelli, and Geisler use the term “natural” but don’t refer to laws of nature:

• temporarily makes an exception to the natural order of things (Purtill)
• an intervention in the system of natural causes (Kreeft & Tacelli)
• that interrupts the natural course of events (Geisler)

Kreeft and Geisler are Thomists or admirers of Aquinas, so their definitions are probably based on Thomistic thinking about miracles.

The definition by Evans has no baseline element. It mentions neither laws of nature or any sort of natural order. I must admit that the simplicity of Evan’s definition is appealing. None of the phrases involving the term “natural” are clear, and although I have a better understanding of the phrase “the laws of nature” than of the phrases “the natural order” or “the system of natural causes” or “the natural course of events”, I also know there are philosophical and conceptual problems surrounding the phrase “the laws of nature”. Perhaps these problems of unclarity and conceptual puzzles could be avoided simply by dropping both the baseline and the exception elements from the definition of the word “miracle”.

If I had to choose between a baseline of “the laws of nature” (Habermas) or “the normal working of the laws of nature” (Flew) on the one hand and “the natural order of things (Purtill) or “the natural course of events” (Geisler) on the other hand, I would go with a baseline element using the phrase “the laws of nature”. That is because the phrase “the laws of nature” is clearer than the alternatives given by Purtill or Geisler. But if we can drop the baseline element and the exception element completely, that would be the best solution, because there are conceptual issues that come along with the phrase “the laws of nature”.

What is the REASON for having a baseline and an exception element in definitions of “miracle”? One reason might be in order to ensure that miracles were “striking” or “amazing” or “astounding”. If an event is contrary to the normal working of the laws of nature, then that would make the event seem “striking” or “amazing” or “astounding”.

Another reason might be in order to make it possible to identify an event as having been caused by God. God is the creator of the laws of nature, so what better way to show that an event was caused by God than for the event to involve the violation or suspension or alteration of a law of nature?

But if these are the REASONS for having baseline and exception elements in a definition of “miracle”, then we may strip these elements out of definitions of “miracle”, because these REASONS are not good reasons. We have previously noted that requiring that an event be “striking” or “amazing” or “astounding” is a bad idea. Although some miracles might well have such psychological impacts on some people, it is clear that an event can be a miracle even if NOBODY has such an emotional response to the event.

If the REASON for having baseline and exception elements in a definition of “miracle” is to make it possible to identify an event as having been caused by God, then that is also not a good reason. First, angels, demons, gods and even psychics can (allegedly) cause events that violate, suspend, or alter the laws of nature, so such events might well be caused by beings other than God.

Second, there is no reason to believe that all miracles are identifiable as events that were caused by God. God, if God exists, might well want for some of the interventions that God makes in the natural world to be unnoticed by humans, to be secret miracles. God, if God exists, is omnipotent and omniscient, so God is capable of intervening in the natural world by violating or suspending or altering a law of nature to bring about a particular event and to do so in a way that this intervention is not identifiable by humans as being an event that was caused by God. (Note: When I discuss the element of PURPOSE, I will argue that the assumption that every miracle is performed in order to teach humans an important theological truth is a FALSE assumption.)

AQUINAS AND HUME ON MIRACLES AND NATURE

Much philosophical discussion about miracles has roots in the writings of Aquinas and Hume about miracles. Aquinas relates miracles to nature and the natural order, and Hume relates miracles to laws of nature. So, before we toss out the baseline and exception elements of definitions of the word “miracle”, we should figure out, if possible, why Aquinas and Hume contrast miracles with the natural order and with natural laws. Does Aquinas have a good reason for contrasting miracles with the natural order? Does Hume have a good reason for contrasting miracles with natural laws?

These questions about the thinking of Aquinas and of Hume about miracles will be the focus of the next post in this series.